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 Over the last decade, there has been a revolution in 
cross-border tax information exchange and reporting. While this 
dramatic shift was the product of multiple forces and events, a 
fundamental reality is that politics, technology, and law inter-
sected to drive the shift to the point where nation-states will 
now transmit and receive from each other significant ongoing 
flows of taxpayer information. States can now expect to accumu-
late large stashes of data on cross-border income, assets, and ac-
tivities on a scale and level of comprehensiveness unmatched by 
previous information exchange regimes. 
 This article examines the pressing follow-up question of 
how this data will be used and what issues nation-states will 
confront when data comes home. Although concerns about data 
protection and use have been raised in critiquing the new cross-
border information exchange regimes, a systematic examination 
of how governments might use or fail to use data and when 
those uses will pose unacceptable risks has yet to be undertak-
en. This article analyzes how domestic politics, priorities, and 
institutions are likely to affect tax enforcement and data usage 
at the nation-state level going forward. We argue that despite 
the dominant focus on global developments, domestic politics 
and technological constraints will likely play an equally if not 
more significant role in data use and protection as countries re-
ceive data and decide what to do with it. The mere fact that col-
lective political will on a global level produced the information 
revolution does not prevent domestic forces from either derail-
ing the revolution in practice or redirecting data to other uses. 
This article maps the potential risks and examines the extent to 
which individual nation-states will have the capacity or inclina-
tion to conduct enforcement, protect taxpayer privacy, and at-
tend to distributional outcomes and risks. We ultimately articu-
late a framework for understanding the country-level factors 
likely to affect outcomes and pathways when data comes home. 
 Au cours de la dernière décennie, une révolution s’est 
produite en matière de rapports et d’échanges transfrontaliers 
de renseignements fiscaux. Bien que ce changement spectacu-
laire soit le produit de forces et d’événements multiples, c’est 
fondamentalement le croisement de la politique, de la technolo-
gie et du droit qui a guidé ce changement vers la transmission et 
la réception par les États de flux importants d’information con-
cernant les contribuables. Désormais, les États peuvent 
s’attendre à accumuler de vastes réserves de données par rap-
port aux revenus, activités et actifs transfrontaliers, et ce, à une 
échelle et à un niveau d’exhaustivité inégalés par les précédents 
régimes d’échange d’informations. 
 Cet article examine la question urgente de l’utilisation de 
ces données et les problèmes auxquels les États seront confron-
tés lorsqu’elles leur parviendront. Bien que des préoccupations 
relatives à la protection et l’utilisation de ces données aient été 
soulevées pour critiquer les nouveaux régimes transfrontaliers 
d’échange d’information, un examen systématique de la manière 
dont les gouvernements pourraient utiliser ou non ces données 
et des moments où ces utilisations poseraient des risques inac-
ceptables n’a pas encore été entrepris. Cet article analyse la 
manière dont la politique intérieure, les priorités et les institu-
tions étatiques sont dorénavant susceptibles d’affecter 
l’application de la législation fiscale et l’utilisation de ces don-
nées à l’échelle étatique. Il soutient qu’en dépit de l’importance 
accordée aux développements mondiaux en la matière, la poli-
tique intérieure et les contraintes technologiques joueront pro-
bablement un rôle tout aussi important, sinon plus, dans 
l’utilisation et la protection de ces données à mesure que les 
pays les recevront et décideront de leur utilisation. Le simple 
fait que la volonté politique collective globale ait produit une ré-
volution de l’information n’empêche pas les forces politiques in-
térieures de faire dérailler la révolution en pratique ou de redi-
riger ces données vers d’autres utilisations. Cet article cartogra-
phie les risques potentiels de cette révolution et examine dans 
quelle mesure les États auront la capacité ou la volonté de la 
faire appliquer, de protéger la vie privée des contribuables et de 
s’afférer aux résultats et aux risques liés à cette diffusion de ces 
données. Enfin, il définit un cadre permettant de comprendre 
les facteurs nationaux susceptibles d’influencer les consé-
quences et les parcours de ces données lorsqu’elles parviendront 
aux États. 
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 In the last decade, there has been a revolution in cross-border tax in-
formation exchange and reporting.1 A combination of shifting political dy-
namics, increasing technological capabilities, and countries’ ability to 
harness international politics to force legal changes at the nation-state 
level has led to a new order in which many countries will now transmit 
and exchange significant ongoing flows of taxpayer information.2 As a re-
sult, many states can now expect to accumulate large stashes of data on 
the cross-border income, assets, and activities of taxpayers on a scale and 
level of comprehensiveness unmatched under previous information ex-
change regimes. 
 This symposium article examines the pressing follow-up question of 
how country-level characteristics will shape the path of the tax infor-
mation revolution when data “comes home” to various nation-states. Con-
cerns about how tax data will be used are not new; they emerged in early 
critiques of the new information exchange regimes.3 However, a deeper 
and more systematic delineation of the specific pathways and risks has 
yet to receive sufficient attention. This article highlights how domestic 
politics, priorities, and institutions—not just technology and laws agreed 
upon at a global level—are likely to affect the use of exchanged tax data 
and the future of enforcement. Despite the disproportionate attention to 
technological changes, political shifts, and legal outcomes at the global 
 
1   See Susan C Morse, “Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Report-
ing” (2012) 57:3 Vill L Rev 529 [Morse, “Ask for Help”]; Itai Grinberg, “Taxing Cap-
ital Income in Emerging Countries: Will FACTA [sic] Open the Door?” (2013) 5:3 
World Tax J 325 at 327; Itai Grinberg, “Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment 
for the International Tax System” (2012) Georgetown Law Faculty Working Paper 
No 160, online: <scholarship.law.georgetown.edu> [perma.cc/GL8T-CQ2S]. 
2   See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, “Leak-Driven Law” (2018) 65:3 UCLA L Rev 532 
(explaining how technology-enabled leaks of tax data influenced cross-border en-
forcement choices); Lukas Hakelberg, “The Power Politics of International Tax Co-
operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the Automatic Exchange of Information” 
(2015) 22:3 J European Public Policy 409. 
3   See e.g. US, Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, 111th Cong, 1st Sess, No 111-35 (Washington, DC: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 2011) at 108–09 (statement of Investment Fund Institute of 
Canada, citing cybersecurity and data breach concerns) [Foreign Bank Account Re-
porting Hearing]; ibid at 61–62 (statement of Dirk JJ Suringa). See also OECD, 
Keeping It Safe: The OECD Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality of Infor-
mation Exchanged for Tax Purposes (Paris: OECD, 2012), online: <www.oecd.org> 
[perma.cc/DKR7-G2JJ] (articulating a framework for the protection of exchanged 
tax data). 
710    (2019) 64:4   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
  
level, the distinct realities of each country’s domestic sphere will drive 
substantive outcomes to a large degree and should not be ignored. This 
article maps the specific modes through which domestic politics, priori-
ties, and institutions will likely exert effects, identifies factors likely to 
shape domestic uses of and attitudes toward data, and outlines the likely 
outcomes and pathways forward. Ultimately, an appreciation for the im-
portant political, economic, cultural, institutional, and legal differences 
between differently situated nation-states will be essential in managing 
risks and outcomes once exchanged tax data comes home. 
 Part I sets the stage by outlining the global information needs of a 
modern tax system and the basic mechanisms by which those needs can 
be satisfied. Part II maps the interplay of technology and politics at a 
global level that sparked the tax information revolution and led to global 
changes in information exchange. It then reviews the most prominent 
products of this information revolution—automatic information exchange 
under the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 
the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS), and the OECD Base Ero-
sion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project country-by-country (CbC) report-
ing requirements. Part III considers what will actually happen when the 
information revolution turns inward and when country-level tax admin-
istrations receive information and make decisions about its use. Specifi-
cally, Part III flags a number of key risks and outcomes, identifies the fac-
tors that are likely to shape these risks and outcomes, and maps the po-
tential pathways by which other countries might react or respond. 
I. Tax Information Across Borders: Sources, Uses, and Traditional 
Constraints 
 We first review the importance of information in cross-border taxa-
tion, highlighting its uses and sources and the traditional limitations on 
its availability and application.  
A. Uses 
 Tax administration requires information about taxpayers.4 In the ab-
sence of adequate information, tax determinations and enforcement will 
 
4   See Leandra Lederman & Joseph C Dugan, “Information Matters in Tax Enforce-
ment” (2019) Indiana University Maurer School of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 396, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3325598>; 
Leandra Lederman, “Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?” (2010) 78:4 Fordham L Rev 1733 at 1734–35. 
Cf Wei Cui, “Taxation Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of 
Modern Tax Collection” (2018) 20:1 U Pa J Bus L 93; Michael Keen & Jenny E 
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be inaccurate, unsuccessful, or unprincipled. As is well acknowledged in 
the literature, tax compliance increases if information is corroborated by 
third-party reporting but decreases if information cannot be corroborated 
(e.g., in the case of cash businesses).5  
 Specifically, information plays a direct role in determining taxpayer 
liability. For example, information provided by third-party reporters can 
help taxpayers and governments calculate tax owed, match amounts re-
ported by taxpayers, and implement withholding systems. Information 
also plays a crucial role in guiding audit and investigation of tax returns 
by letting the government know where to allocate scarce enforcement re-
sources.6  
 Finally, information is important for tax policy analysis and develop-
ment. In the United States, for instance, the IRS engages in a wide range 
of studies and analyses, some annual, others as part of specific programs, 
and still others on an as-needed basis. For example, the IRS publishes an 
annual “Data Book” providing statistical data.7 The IRS Advance Pricing 
Agreement Program8 is required by Congress to publish a public report 
annually on the operations of the program.9 Outside of the IRS, other 
      
Ligthart, “Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer” (2006) 13:1 
Intl Tax & Public Finance 81. 
5   See Joel Slemrod et al, “Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small- 
Business Tax Compliance?” (2015) National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper No 21412, online: <www.nber.org/papers/w21412> [perma.cc/782K-
MDB7]; Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, “Cash Busi-
nesses and Tax Evasion” (2009) 20:1 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 37; Jonas Andersson, Fred 
Schroyen & Gaute Torsvik, “The Impact of International Tax Information Ex-
change Agreements on the Use of Tax Amnesty: Evidence from Norway” 
(2019) NHH Department of Economics Discussion Paper 16/2019, online: <openac-
cess.nhh.no> [perma.cc/62UR-PZSS]. 
6   But see Annet Wanyana Oguttu, “The Role of International Cooperation in Preventing 
Tax Evasion: A Critique on ‘Assistance in the Collection of Taxes’—A South African 
Perspective” (2014) 68:9 Bulletin for Intl Taxation 1 (arguing that data alone is inade-
quate and that assistance in collecting taxes will be critical). 
7   See e.g. US, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Data Book 
2017, (Washington, DC: Internal Revenue Service, 2018), online (pdf): <www.irs. 
gov> [perma.cc/5ZEN-3XQM]. 
8   Now known as the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program. 
9   See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub L No 106-
170, § 521(b), 113 Stat 1860 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to publish 
annual reports). For a recent advance pricing agreement report, see e.g. “An-
nouncement and Report Concerning Advance Pricing Agreements” (27 March 
2017), online (pdf): IRS <www.irs.gov> [perma.cc/474Z-F8UB]. 
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governmental bodies, such as the Congressional Budget Office,10 as well 
as academic researchers,11 rely on tax data to evaluate tax policy issues, 
including tax compliance, tax burdens, tax gaps, tax expenditures, and 
the impact of taxes on investment. Tax administrations in other countries 
engage in similar sorts of information analysis as well. 
B. Sources 
 Tax information can come from five basic sources: (1) taxpayers them-
selves;12 (2) third parties with reporting obligations, such as employers 
and other payors; (3) whistleblowers, the media, non-governmental organ-
izations, and similar actors;13 (4) audits and investigations by a country’s 
own tax administration; and (5) tax administrations and actors in other 
countries. The first can be unreliable reporters about their own affairs. 
The second source has historically been difficult to mandate in the cross-
border context, because third parties abroad may not be subject to report-
ing obligations imposed by another country. Moreover, the third source is 
idiosyncratic and difficult to deploy in a systematic way,14 and the fourth 
is often subject to significant resource constraints.  
 In light of these difficulties, turning to tax administrations of other 
countries for information is a logically appealing way for countries to ob-
tain the information necessary to collect taxes.15 Yet, as discussed in Part 
 
10   For a review of CBO projects and reports assessing the tax system and federal rev-
enues, see “Taxes” (last visited 2 April 2019), online: Congressional Budget Office 
<www.cbo.gov/topics/taxes> [perma.cc/FG6T-W8B6]. 
11   See e.g. Katharine G Abraham et al, “Measuring the Gig Economy: Current 
Knowledge and Open Issues” (2018) National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper No 24950, DOI: <10.3386/w24950> (integrating census and tax data to 
assess the gig economy). 
12   See e.g. Mohammed Amidu, William Coffie & Philomina Acquah, “Transfer Pricing, 
Earnings Management and Tax Avoidance of Firms in Ghana” (2019) 26:1 J Financial 
Crime 235 (advocating expanded reporting by multinational corporations on related-
party transactions based on an empirical study of transfer pricing and tax avoidance in 
Ghana).  
13   See e.g. Oei & Ring, supra note 2; Shu-Yi Oei, “The Offshore Tax Enforcement 
Dragnet” (2018) 67:4 Emory LJ 655 at 671 (describing how whistleblower leaks of 
prior years’ misconduct led to 2008 US tax enforcement initiatives).  
14   For example, information obtained from whistleblowers or through data leaks may sur-
face many years after the tax return in question has been filed. 
15   See e.g. Diane M Ring, “Corporate Migrations and Tax Transparency and Disclo-
sure” (2017) 62:1 Saint Louis ULJ 175 [Ring, “Corporate Migrations”] (arguing 
that increased transparency and disclosure requirements are the result of in-
creased business cross-border flexibility in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century). Cf Miltiadis Makris, “International Tax Competition: There Is No Need 
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IC, prior to the recent cross-border information revolution, governments 
and tax authorities faced challenges in cross-border tax enforcement due 
to limitations on the ability to secure information from foreign tax admin-
istrations and third-party reporters.16 Paired with limited resources to 
audit taxpayers themselves and limited availability of information from 
other sources, this lack of third-party corroboration meant enforcement of 
tax obligations in cross-border and offshore matters was difficult. As Part 
II will describe, increasing technological capabilities and shifts in interna-
tional politics since 2008 created conditions more conducive to infor-
mation sharing, thus leading to the global tax information revolution.17  
C. Limits 
 Tax administrations have traditionally faced multiple limitations in 
accessing cross-border tax information, primarily due to legal, political, 
and technological constraints. 
 Legal Constraints. Government techniques for finding, seizing, and 
using information pertaining to a taxpayer’s potential tax return and tax 
obligations are necessarily subject to legal limits. In the domestic context, 
a warrant might be required before the tax authority may enter taxpayer 
premises and seize documents. In the cross-border context, legal rules 
and regimes have also traditionally cabined government cross-border tax 
information gathering efforts. Such rules are sometimes located in domes-
tic legislation,18 but in other cases they may result from treaties or other 
international agreements that set limits on information sharing.19 For ex-
      
for Cooperation in Information Sharing” (2003) 11:3 Rev Intl Economics 555 (mod-
el showing that information exchange does not matter for equilibrium outcomes).  
16   For example, tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) entered into by the 
United States provide for exchange of information only upon request. See Diane 
Ring, “Article 26: Exchange of Information” in Richard Vann et al, eds, Global Tax 
Treaty Commentaries (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 
2017), §§ 2.1.4, 3.1.3 [Ring, “Article 26”]. Cf OECD, Standard for Automatic Ex-
change of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (Paris: OECD, 2014), 
online: <www.oecd-ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/3RUC-9NPM] [OECD, Standard for Auto-
matic Exchange]. 
17   See supra note 1. 
18   For example, Switzerland during the twentieth century developed strong bank secrecy 
laws that significantly shaped the country’s participation in exchange of tax infor-
mation. See e.g. Bradley J Bondi, “Don’t Tread on Me: Has the United States Govern-
ment’s Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss 
Bank Secrecy Laws?” (2010) 30:1 Nw J Intl L & Bus 1 (providing history and overview 
of Swiss bank secrecy rules). 
19   Tax information exchange agreements, for example, typically provide for information 
exchange on request (see supra note 16). In contrast, a recent example of international 
agreements delineating parameters for more consistent information sharing are the in-
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ample, constraints on cross-border information sharing have traditionally 
been imposed by assorted features of existing tax treaty networks, domes-
tic criminal laws of various jurisdictions, a patchwork of tax information 
exchange agreements, and rather ineffectual laws governing cross-border 
tax information flows.20 Thus, the terms under which information crossed 
borders were cumbersome and heavily negotiated, and information avail-
able to tax authorities was therefore limited.  
 As we discuss in Part IIB, the global information revolution has re-
sulted in the introduction of new laws and regimes that increase the ease 
of information exchange, including FATCA in the United States and its 
implementing intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) signed with other 
countries, as well as a broader emerging multilateral framework for in-
formation exchange.21 This combination of new domestic legislation and 
bilateral commitments has resulted in increased access for tax authorities 
to cross-border financial and tax data.  
 Political Constraints. Political constraints have traditionally also 
played a central role in dictating a tax administration’s access to infor-
mation, and these dynamics can be exacerbated with respect to cross-
border information. For example, while some countries were interested in 
greater information and transparency regarding the offshore activities of 
their taxpayers, other jurisdictions had vested interests in maintaining 
secrecy.22 As a result, prior to the recent information revolution, the impe-
      
tergovernmental agreements (IGAs) signed against the backdrop of the US Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act legislation and discussed below in Part IIB. See e.g. Susan 
Morse, “Why FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Bind the U.S. Government” 
(2013) 70:3 Tax Notes Intl 245 [Morse, “FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements”]. 
20   See e.g. Oei, supra note 13 at 668–71 (describing pre-2008 cross-border tax en-
forcement initiatives); J Richard (Dick) Harvey Jr, “Offshore Accounts: Insider’s 
Summary of FATCA and Its Potential Future” (2012) 57:3 Vill L Rev 471 at 475–76 
(discussing problems with the pre-FATCA Qualified Intermediary system); Reuven 
S Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, “Find It and Tax It: From TIEAs to IGAs” (2015) Univer-
sity of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 443, DOI: 
<10.2139/ssrn.2567646> (discussing the evolution of IGAs); Allison Christians, 
“The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why It Matters)” (2013) 69:6 Tax Notes 
Intl 565 (placing IGAs in legal context) [Christians, “Legal Pedigree of IGAs”]. 
21   See e.g.  Morse, “FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements”, supra note 19. See also Part 
II.B., below. 
22   See generally Nicholas Shaxson, “Tackling Tax Havens: The Billions Attracted by Tax 
Havens Do Harm to Sending and Receiving Nations Alike” (2019) 56:3 Finance & De-
velopment 6 (discussing the dollar flows through tax havens and some of the winners 
and losers). 
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tus toward tax information sharing was limited and slow to expand in the 
cross-border context.23 
 As we discuss in Part IIA, a mix of factors—political and otherwise—
combined during the first decade or so of the twenty-first century to pro-
duce the dramatically new tax information landscape that we see today, 
one in which many tax administrations now have potentially extensive 
and timely access to information about taxpayers and their cross-border 
income and assets. Moreover, political forces are continuing to press for 
changes in global tax information regimes—some advocates urge in-
creased information reporting and transparency to the public, while oth-
ers express serious reservations about the benefits of reporting and trans-
parency, noting their potential risks.24 These forces will shape the future 
trajectory of the information revolution. 
 Technological Constraints. Finally, information in the tax system has 
always been a function of technology. In a digitized and computerized 
world, taxpayer data can be readily transmitted, processed, utilized in en-
forcement, and stored. By contrast, in the earlier paper-dominated world, 
ad hoc requests for information (for example, by bilateral agreement or 
treaty) were a more plausible mechanism than requiring consistent and 
ongoing exchange of large swaths of taxpayer information. 
 The rise of computerization in the twentieth century has fundamen-
tally shifted the realistic options for collecting and using information in 
the tax system, as it has done in other areas of the economy, including 
cross-border commerce itself.25 With the rise of computerization and digit-
ization, the ability to implement tax information reporting and sharing on 
a large scale—for example, through reporting obligations imposed on 
third parties, financial institutions, or foreign governments—has become 
increasingly realistic and has made possible the global tax information 
revolution. 
 In short, all along the way, technological capabilities have dictated the 
degree to which tax administrations can efficiently integrate information 
 
23   See Ring, “Article 26”, supra note 16; Oei, supra note 13 at 668–71 (describing pre-
2008 cross-border tax enforcement initiatives); Harvey, supra note 20 at 475–76 
(discussing problems with the pre-FATCA Qualified Intermediary system). 
24   See e.g. Allison Christians & Arthur Cockfield, “Submission to Finance Department 
on Implementation of FATCA in Canada: Submission on Legislative Proposals Relat-
ing to the Canada–United States Enhanced Tax Information Exchange Agreement” 
(10 March 2014) [unpublished, archived at SSRN], DOI: <10.2139/ssrn.2407264> 
(discussing risks of FATCA IGAs, including violations of the Charter and of interna-
tional law); Lee A Sheppard, “FATCA Is a Drone: What to Do About Compliance” 
(2011) 64:1 Tax Notes Intl 10 at 12–13; Oei, supra note 13 at 691–93. 
25   See Ring, “Corporate Migrations”, supra note 15. 
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into their existing systems and tax enforcement practices. Of course, to 
the extent jurisdictions currently lack access to such technology due to re-
source or capacity constraints, the new transparency and disclosure re-
quirements may result in notable resource demands and burdens. 
II. The Global Tax Information Revolution  
 The latter half of the twentieth century saw a significant increase in 
cross-border activity. As such, tax administrations’ pressing need for bet-
ter access to information in order to enforce cross-border tax compliance 
gradually took centre stage. Ultimately, a variety of factors resulted in a 
tipping point, with the global tax information revolution as the end result. 
This Part briefly describes the interaction of political, social, and techno-
logical forces that combined to produce the information revolution and 
identifies the most significant results of this revolution to date. 
A. The Path to Revolution: Key Historical Events 
 A brief, non-exhaustive tour of some of the key historical moments 
that have propelled global tax transparency and disclosure forward re-
veals how politics, technological advances, and legal changes interacted 
and eventually shaped policy priorities and outcomes, resulting in the 
new global reality of tax transparency and information exchange.  
1. From Harmful Tax Competition to Transparency and Information 
Exchange 
 As has been outlined elsewhere in the literature,26 tax competition27 
became the subject of much debate internationally in the 1990s. Tax com-
 
26   See e.g. Diane Ring, “Who Is Making International Tax Policy?: International Or-
ganizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World” (2010) 33:3 Fordham Intl 
LJ 649 at 702–15 [Ring, “International Tax Policy”]. See also Thomas F Field, “Tax 
Competition in Europe and America” (2003) 29:13 Tax Notes Intl 1235; Julie Roin, 
“Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competi-
tion” (2001) 89:3 Geo LJ 543 at 546–49 (appreciating the relationship between re-
duced business taxation and investment and describing the general practices of the 
United States and Europe); Adam H Rosenzweig, “Harnessing the Costs of Inter-
national Tax Arbitrage” (2007) 26:3 Va Tax Rev 555 (“[t]ax competition arises from 
the intentional use of tax rates or special tax regimes by states, such as ‘ring fenc-
ing’ and secrecy laws, to attract capital” at 587, n 60); Yoram Margalioth, “Tax 
Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System to 
Promote Developing Countries” (2003) 23:1 Va Tax Rev 161 at 187–90 (defining tax 
incentives as a particularized deviation from a baseline and providing examples). 
27   See e.g. Gary Clyde Hufbauer assisted by Joanna M van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of Inter-
national Income: Blueprint for Reform (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1992) (positing that “[t]ax competition often starts when one country 
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petition broadly refers to a country’s use of its tax system to attract in-
vestment or capital flows away from other countries, often through low 
rates or narrow tax bases. At its core, the debate drew attention to the 
question of whether such tax competition could, under certain circum-
stances, be appropriately characterized as harmful, and if so when. 
 As an outgrowth of the tax competition debates and at the prompting 
of several countries,28 the OECD published a report29 on tax competition 
in 1998. The report attempted to map out those versions of tax competi-
tion that should be considered “harmful” in the sense that they would 
trigger a race to the bottom in terms of tax rates and ultimately revenue 
collection and tax base erosion. (Notably, base erosion was a topic to 
which the OECD returned in 2013 with its Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing project.)30  
 Once adopted by the OECD, the harmful tax competition report faced 
backlash from the business community,31 which complained that it had 
had inadequate input into the report’s analysis, drafting, and recommen-
dations. Subsequently, the Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP)—a 
US non-profit organization with a mission to “preserve jurisdictional tax 
competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy”32—used a two-
      
lowers its tax rates in an effort to attract outside investment” at 29); Mitchell A 
Kane & Edward B Rock, “Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competi-
tion” (2008) 106:7 Mich L Rev 1229 at 1233–34 (acknowledging that jurisdictions 
often exploit differentials in tax systems in order to attract capital); David 
C Elkins, “The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy” (2016) 91:3 
Ind LJ 905 (arguing that international tax competition is inevitable and, if part of 
a system of free and fair tax competition, can maximize global welfare). 
28   See e.g. Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Cri-
sis of the Welfare State” (2000) 113:7 Harv L Rev 1573 at 1603 (identifying France 
and Japan as the primary players); Jacqueline B Manasterli, “OECD, EU, U.S. 
Representatives Discuss Tax Haven Initiatives” (1999) 18 Tax Notes Intl 2383 
at 2383 (quoting Richard M Hammer, Chair of the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee (BIAC) Taxation and Fiscal Committee, as referencing rumours that 
the US Treasury led the initiative). 
29   See OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, 1998), 
online (pdf): <www.oecd-ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/49CP-EXNM]. 
30   See “The OECD Work on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (4 February 2013) at 1, 
online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/6Z6Q-VEN4] (discussing political 
attention paid to base erosion issues in 2012). 
31   See Manasterli, supra note 28 at 2383 (quoting Chair of the BIAC Taxation and 
Fiscal Committee, Richard M Hammer); Business and Industry Advisory Commit-
tee to the OECD, “A Business View on Tax Competition” (June 1999), reprinted in 
(2000) 40:9 European Taxation 421. A copy of the report can also be found in (1999) 
19 Tax Notes Intl 277 at 281. 
32   “About CF&P” (last visited 25 July 2019), online: Center for Freedom and Prosperity 
<freedomandprosperity.org> [perma.cc/L5FN-7YC6]. 
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prong strategy of engaging with the members of the US Congress (in-
cluding the US Congressional Black Caucus)33 and tax havens (the tar-
gets of the OECD report) to convince them to resist the OECD tax compe-
tition policy and to withdraw US support from the tax competition work.34 
The CFP’s strategic actions took place against a backdrop of other organi-
zations challenging the value of OECD tax competition efforts for the 
United States.35 
 The OECD’s work on harmful tax competition in the 1990s did help 
expand the participation of non-OECD countries and encourage the elim-
ination of problematic tax regimes within EU member states.36 More no-
tably for the purposes of this discussion, however, as a result of CFP lob-
bying and the complaints of business interests, the OECD shifted its focus 
away from criticizing tax competition per se and toward promotion of 
transparency and exchange of information.37 To be sure, the information 
agreements that were promoted and executed prior to the more recent in-
formation revolution were not automatic information exchange agree-
 
33   Congressional Black Caucus members directed their objections to the negative ef-
fects on low-income nations (especially US neighbours in the Caribbean) of the 
OECD’s attack on harmful tax competition. See e.g. Field, supra note 26 (noting 
that the Caucus “was induced to speak out against the OECD plan, on the basis of 
solidarity with people of color living in Caribbean tax havens” at 1242). See also 
Cordia Scott, “Congressional Black Caucus Says OECD Tax Move Unfairly Blasts 
Developing Nations” (2001) 22:14 Tax Notes Intl 1600 at 1600 (twenty-six of the 
thirty-eight members of the caucus addressed a letter to Secretary of the Treasury 
Paul O’Neill reiterating this concern); Ring, “International Tax Policy”, supra 
note 26 at 709, n 296. 
34   See Ring, “International Tax Policy”, supra note 26 at 709; Diane M Ring, “What’s 
at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State” 
(2008) 49:1 Va J Intl L 155 at 187–89, 195–96. The CFP’s success could be tracked 
through subsequent statements and letters from members of Congress. For exam-
ple, Majority House Leader Richard K. Armey, the first major member of Congress 
to challenge the tax competition project, urged the then Secretary of the Treasury 
Lawrence Summers to withdraw US support for the harmful tax competition pro-
ject. See also Robert Goulder, “New Coalition Strikes Back at OECD Tax Haven 
Campaign” (2000) 21 Tax Notes Intl 2650 at 2653 (reporting interviews with CFP 
founders Mitchell and Quinlan, who outlined the CFP plan to stop the OECD tax 
competition project). 
35   See e.g. Daniel J Mitchell, “A Tax Competition Primer: Why Tax Harmonization and 
Information Exchange Undermine America’s Competitive Advantage in the Global 
Economy” (20 July 2001), online: The Heritage Foundation <www.heritage.org> 
[perma.cc/L9LW-UA5A].  
36   See OECD, “Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Pur-
poses” (19 January 2010) at para 25, online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org>  
[perma.cc/9GH3-CPRU] [OECD, “Promoting Transparency”]. 
37   See ibid. See also Hugh J Ault, “Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing 
International Tax Norms” (2009) 34:3 Brooklyn LJ 757 at 759, 770–71; Martin 
A Sullivan, “Lessons from the Last War on Tax Havens” (2007) 116 Tax Notes 327. 
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ments but rather were standard tax information exchange agreements 
(TIEAs) or income tax treaty provisions calling for exchange generally on 
request.38 However, the roots of our contemporary automatic information 
exchange and global transparency and disclosure regimes can be seen in 
the earlier shift from substantive critiques of harmful tax competition to-
ward promotion of transparency and disclosure, due to lobbying and re-
lated challenges.39 
2. Tax Leaks and Tax Publicity 
 Another important driver of the global transparency and disclosure in-
itiatives was significant leaks of tax data and the activities of tax whistle-
blowers and hackers.40 While the existence of offshore tax evasion by indi-
viduals had long been known, the issue was arguably made more salient 
by a series of high-profile tax data leaks starting around 2008.41 Similar-
ly, tax leaks in Luxembourg and the Bahamas illuminated the cross-
border structuring activities of entity and business taxpayers as well, and 
revealed the roles played by tax haven jurisdictions in allowing such 
structuring to flourish.42 
 These leaks, which were made possible by the growing computeriza-
tion, digitization, and storability of taxpayer data, highlighted the magni-
tude of offshore tax avoidance and evasion by high-net-worth individual 
 
38   In 2009, almost 200 TIEAs and 110 double taxation conventions were concluded or 
revised with language committing its signatories to engage in transparency and 
exchange of information. See OECD, “Promoting Transparency”, supra note 36 at 
para 9. 
39   Notably, the 1990s effort to identify and respond to harmful tax competition also ulti-
mately re-emerged in the Harmful Tax Practices project of Action 5 of the BEPS 
framework. See e.g. Lilian V Faulhaber, “The Trouble with Tax Competition: From 
Practice to Theory” (2018) 71:2 Tax L Rev 311. See also Miranda Stewart, “Global Tax 
Information Networks: Legitimacy in a Global Administrative State” in Yariv Brauner 
& Miranda Stewart, eds, Tax, Law and Development (Cheltenham: Edward El-
gar, 2013) 316 (noting earlier moves toward administrative co-operation among na-
tional tax agencies). 
40   See e.g. Allison Christians, “Lux Leaks: Revealing the Law, One Plain Brown En-
velope at a Time” (2014) 76:12 Tax Notes Intl 1123 at 1123–25. 
41   See e.g. Randall Jackson, “Swiss Bank Official Detained by U.S. Authorities” 
(2008) 50:6 Tax Notes Intl 473 at 473–74; Lynnley Browning, “Banking Scandal 
Unfolds Like a Thriller”, The New York Times (14 August 2008), online: 
<www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/L4QH-DSGH] [Browning, “Banking Scandal Un-
folds”]. 
42   See e.g. Omri Marian, “The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance” 
(2017) 7:1 Harv Bus L Rev 1 (examining a dataset of advance tax agreements in 
Luxembourg and their role in facilitating cross-border tax avoidance); Oei & Ring, 
supra note 2 at 563. 
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taxpayers and businesses.43 The leaks provided broad political impetus for 
the enactment of FATCA in the United States, for the OECD Common 
Reporting Standard information exchange initiatives, for the setting up of 
programs in various countries to catch and punish offshore tax cheats, 
and for the development of BEPS CbC reporting.44 
 Related in part to the leaks but providing their own distinct imprint 
on the public conversation about the need for tax transparency were hear-
ings in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
about multinationals and their tax conduct. For example, the US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs conducted a series of hearings fo-
cusing on prominent US multinationals, including Microsoft, Hewlett 
Packard,45 and Apple.46 These hearings publicly highlighted the tax plan-
ning strategies of multinationals and the success of these strategies in 
greatly reducing the tax liabilities of these corporations over a period of 
years. Later, the European Commission state aid investigations into Ap-
ple and its arrangements with Ireland specifically cited the US Senate 
hearings as a source of its data on Apple.47 Across the Atlantic during this 
same period (2012–2013), the United Kingdom similarly pursued publicly 
critical inquiries into the tax conduct of multinationals, most famously 
US multinationals Google and Starbucks.48 
 
43   See Oei & Ring, supra note 2; Oei, supra note 13 at 659. 
44   See the discussion in Part II.B., below. 
45   Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard were the subject of the first US hearing. See US, 
Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code–Part 1 (Microsoft and Hewlett-
Packard): Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 
112th Cong (20 September 2012) (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2013), online (pdf): <www.govinfo.gov> [perma.cc/Z89M-64PM]. 
46   See US, Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code–Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hear-
ing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 113th Cong 
(21 May 2013) (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 
online (pdf): <www.govinfo.gov> [perma.cc/E5ZU-JLJZ]. 
47   See EC, State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN)—Alleged aid to Apple, [2014] 
OJ, C 369/22 at 27 (letter from the European Commission to Ireland regarding the 
Apple case, 11 June 2014, noting the role of the US Senate hearings). See also 
Chris William Sanchirico, “As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and 
Ownership Nationality” (2015) 68:2 Tax L Rev 207 at 208–09, n 1 (citing the ex-
tensive media coverage of the tax practices of major multinationals); Jesse Drucker 
& Simon Bowers, “After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Prof-
its”, The New York Times (6 November 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com> [perma. 
cc/77DZ-ZG89] (detailing Apple’s evolving international tax planning).  
48   See e.g. UK, Committee of Public Accounts, Tax Avoidance—Google, Ninth Report 
of Session 2013–14 (London, UK: The Stationery Office, 2013), online: <publica-
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3. Financial Crisis 
 Finally, calls for increased tax transparency, disclosure, and exchange 
of information—as well the broader package of OECD base erosion and 
profit shifting tax reforms—gained traction in part due to the financial 
crisis that hit the United States and global markets beginning in 2008. 
The public governmental inquiries of 2012–2013 discussed above were 
part of a broader wave of “tax shaming” directed at multinationals ac-
cused of avoiding their corporate tax responsibilities. The shift toward 
widespread and sustained public attention to multinational taxation has 
been partially attributed to the great recession.49 Multinationals’ growing 
recognition of the reputational risk posed by public perceptions of their 
tax conduct, including boycotts and social media posts, went some way 
toward blunting opposition to international tax reforms.50  
B. End Products of the Revolution 
 By this point, the events and developments described above have cul-
minated in no less than a global tax information revolution, the main 
components of which are automatic information exchange regimes and 
enhanced reporting for multinationals.  
1. Automatic Information: CRS, FATCA, and Beyond 
 Historically, bilateral treaty-based exchange served as the primary so-
lution to the need for cross-border tax information.51 But treaty-based in-
      
tions.parliament.uk> [perma.cc/9WMU-FBK9] (discussion of the Google Parlia-
ment hearings of November 2012 and subsequent analysis and recommendations); 
“Starbucks, Google and Amazon Grilled over Tax Avoidance”, BBC News (12 No-
vember 2012), online: <www.bbc.com> [perma.cc/B4CW-NHBB]; Simon Bowers & 
Rajeev Syal, “MP on Google Tax Avoidance Scheme: ‘I Think That You Do Evil’”, 
The Guardian (16 May 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com> [perma.cc/9Y5N-
PX2R]. 
49   See e.g. Vanessa Barford & Gerry Holt, “Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The Rise of 
‘Tax Shaming’”, BBC News Magazine (21 May 2013), online: <www.bbc.com> 
[perma.cc/HPN8-AW7Q]; “Tax Havens & Financial Crisis” (last visited 7 April 
2019), online: Tax Justice Network <www.taxjustice.net> [perma.cc/9U5P-NG9K]; 
Helen Miller, “Tax Avoidance: Problem Solved or Solutions Just Beginning?”, Tax 
Journal (14 October 2016), online: <www.ifs.org.uk> [perma.cc/TN67-2FG6] (ob-
serving at 10 that “[i]n the wake of the recession, a broad consensus emerged: mul-
tinationals were shifting too much profit into low tax jurisdictions, in some cases 
managing to avoid tax altogether, and this should be stopped” and that the BEPS 
project emerged as the path to meeting this goal). 
50   See Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 547–48, 556–57; Ruth Mason, “The Transformation of 
International Tax” (2020) 114:3 Am J Intl L 353 at 364–66. 
51   As of the 1930s, the standard double tax treaty began to include an exchange of in-
formation provision, resulting in the establishment of exchange on request as a vir-
 
722    (2019) 64:4   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
  
formation exchange had its limits. Some treaties, like the US–Swiss trea-
ty, did not contain robust information exchange provisions. Even in trea-
ties with more expansive information exchange language, treaty provi-
sions primarily emphasized information exchange on request,52 which 
means that the requesting state already had to have a sense of the under-
lying tax offence and the missing information.53 Additionally, particularly 
prior to a round of TIEAs executed in the 2000s, the number of agree-
ments covering states beyond OECD members and wealthier nations was 
quite limited.54 Taxpayers skilled in hiding their offshore activities and 
deflecting enforcement attention frequently found that their information 
      
tually universal feature of the tax treaty world: see e.g. Diane Ring, “Developing 
Countries in an Age of Transparency and Disclosure” (2016) 6 BYUL Rev 1767 
at 1774–75; Xavier Oberson, International Exchange of Information in Tax Matters: 
Towards Global Transparency (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) at 4–5. Further en-
shrining this mode of information acquisition, both the OECD and the UN Model 
Treaties have long included an Article 26, which calls for exchange of information 
on request and specifies the prerequisites for making a request and the limits on 
use of the information: see e.g. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital: Condensed Version (Paris: OECD, 2017) at 45–46, online: <www.oecd-
ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/T5HA-V8XF]; UN, Model Double Taxation Convention Be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries (New York: UN, 2011) at 32–33, online: 
<www.un.org> [perma.cc/6EUX-N62M]. 
52   Although automatic exchange of information appeared in the Draft Model Convention 
of the League of Nations, exchange of information in the OECD Model Double Taxation 
Convention of 1963 “relied on exchange of information on request ... [although it in-
cluded] various forms of exchange of information, including automatic exchange” 
(Oberson, supra note 51 at 165). Automatic exchange is still included in the OECD 
Model, but is not compulsory (see ibid). For example, the United States Model Tech-
nical Explication Accompanying the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 
November 15, 2006 noted that “the competent authorities of the Contracting States 
may develop an agreement upon the mode of application of the Article” ((2006), art 26, 
para 9, online (pdf): IRS <www.irs.gov> [perma.cc/FF7U-76HK]). However, the 1942 
Canada–US Income Tax Treaty provided that each country should forward “as soon as 
practicable after the close of each calendar year the following information relating to 
such calendar year: The names and addresses of all persons whose addresses are with-
in [the partner state] and who derive from sources within [the other partner state] div-
idends, interest, rents, royalties, salaries, wages, pensions, annuities, or other fixed or 
determinable annual or periodical profits and income, showing the amount of such 
profits and income in the case of each addressee” (Convention and Protocol between 
Canada and the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in the case of Income Taxes, 4 March 1942, Can TS 1942 
No 2, art XX, paras 1–2 (entered into force 15 June 1942)). 
53   See Ring, “Article 26”, supra note 16, § 1.2.5.3. 
54   For a listing of bilateral tax information exchange agreements, see “Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs)”, online: OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/KJB8-
R5TG]. The original OECD model was released in 2002 (see ibid). See also Katarzyna 
Bilicka & Clemens Fuest, “With Which Countries Do Tax Havens Share Information?” 
(2014) 21:2 Intl Tax & Public Finance 175. 
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was safely outside any exchange process because no request would ever 
be generated. 
 Although exchange of information on request continues to have a val-
uable role in tax enforcement, the major revolution in tax information re-
porting and exchange has been a shift to automatic delivery of large 
quantities of data.55 Rather than waiting for countries to identify prob-
lematic taxpayers and transactions and then make an information re-
quest, tax authorities across the globe have now moved to a system where 
information is automatically collected by financial institutions in each 
country and pushed out to tax authorities in other countries. This repre-
sents a sea change in how information is exchanged. 
 The two most prominent examples of such automatic information re-
gimes are automatic exchange of information pursuant to the OECD’s 
Common Reporting Standard and the United States’ FATCA regime (to-
gether with related variants of FATCA-like laws in other countries). 
 Common Reporting Standard. Responding to a 2013 G20 mandate, 
the OECD released in 2014 the first part of its project on automatic in-
formation exchange: the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial 
Account Information: Common Reporting Standard.56 Shortly thereafter, 
the OECD released a companion piece, the Standard for Automatic Ex-
change of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters.57 The second re-
port provided extensive implementation guidance, including (1) a Model 
Competent Authority Agreement (CAA) that states could sign to initiate 
the system of exchange with a treaty partner; (2) the Common Reporting 
Standard itself (that is, details on the exchange process, definitions, re-
porting expectations, and due diligence); and (3) commentary on imple-
mentation.58 In 2018, the OECD released an updated Handbook on the 
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in 
Tax Matters.59 
 
55   See Oberson, supra note 51 at 11–13; Hakelberg, supra note 2. 
56   OECD, “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: Common 
Reporting Standard” (2014), online (pdf): Public Eye <www.publiceye.ch> [perma.cc/ 
DT5V-YS8V].  
57   See OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange, supra note 16. 
58   See ibid at 14–17. In 2016, Canada revised its Income Tax Act to help implement 
the Common Reporting Standard (see Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), 
part XIX). 
59   See OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax 
Matters: Implementation Handbook, 2nd ed (Paris: OECD, 2018), online (pdf): 
<www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/N2HQ-5VMM]. 
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 The system of automatic exchange under CRS seeks to require desig-
nated financial institutions—such as depository institutions, custodial in-
stitutions, investment entities, and insurance companies—to report re-
quired financial account information of non-residents to the tax authori-
ties of their own countries. The information required includes personal 
identifiers (such as the taxpayer’s name, address, tax identification num-
ber, and account number) as well as account details (including gross in-
terest paid, gross dividends paid or credited, gross sales proceeds, account 
balances, and values regarding covered accounts).60  
 Ultimately, for ease of rapid execution of CAAs with a large number of 
treaty partners, the OECD encouraged states to sign a multilateral CAA 
under the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Tax Matters—an instrument to facilitate entering into bilateral trea-
ties between nation-states—which opened up to all countries in 2011.61 
States began signing on to the multilateral CAA in 2014, and as of 2019, 
106 states had joined.62 Some signatories committed to being early 
adopters (2017), while others had target implementation dates of 2018, 
2019, or later.63 In this manner, the CRS was adopted by a large number 
of nation-states. 
 United States FATCA Reporting. In the United States, the Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act enacted in 2010 introduced a version of auto-
matic third-party information reporting by financial institutions, as well 
as a self-reporting requirement for taxpayers.64 Although US law did have 
earlier versions of third-party reporting regarding foreign financial ac-
counts of US taxpayers (such as the “qualified intermediary” reporting 
regime),65 much information escaped the system entirely due to gaps in 
 
60   See ibid at 99–102. 
61   See ibid at 41–43. See also OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange, supra note 
16 at 13. 
62   See OECD, “Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information and Intended First Infor-
mation Exchange Date” (25 June 2019), online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org>  
[perma.cc/UVZ4-H5QE] [OECD, “Signatories of the MCAA”]. 
63   See OECD, “Joint Statement by the Early Adopters Group” (October 2014), online 
(pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/P3UX-QSC3]; Global Forum on Transpar-
ency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, “AEOI: Status of Commit-
ments” (November 2018), online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/TN82-
V363]. 
64   See IRC §§ 1471–74, 6038D (2012). 
65   See US, Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Finance, US 
Senate: Tax Compliance–Qualified Intermediary Program Provides Some Assurance 
That Taxes on Foreign Investors Are Withheld and Reported, but Can Be Improved, 
GAO-08-99 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2007). 
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required information. By contrast, FATCA now obliges foreign financial 
institutions to identify US account holders and to report their identities 
and detailed information on their financial assets and accounts to the 
United States.66 Failure to do so subjects the foreign financial institutions 
to an onerous withholding tax on their own US investment income, which 
disadvantages them competitively.67 
 The new reporting obligations introduced by FATCA were not only po-
tentially burdensome on foreign financial institutions, but they also 
risked placing complying institutions in violation of domestic laws regard-
ing privacy and disclosure of client information.68 Ultimately, this tension 
was resolved at the national level through the negotiation of intergov-
ernmental agreements with many jurisdictions.69 These IGAs detailed a 
process by which foreign financial institutions could satisfy FATCA au-
tomatic reporting obligations without violating their domestic law.70 Like 
the CRS, FATCA represents a fundamental overhaul in how taxpayer fi-
nancial information is shared between countries and how US taxpayers 
are required to self-report their foreign financial assets. 
 Other Countries’ Mini-FATCAs. Other countries, having engaged in 
the IGA negotiations with the United States, sought to institute their own 
version of FATCA and obtain information on their own taxpayers’ foreign 
assets and accounts.71 For example, the United Kingdom signed such an 
agreement with Jersey, effective 2014.72 Eventually, however ,  the 
 
66   See IRC § 1471(c). 
67   See ibid, § 1471(b)(3). 
68   See Christians, “Legal Pedigree of IGAs”, supra note 20; Christians & Cockfield, 
supra note 24. 
69   See Morse, “FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements”, supra note 19 at 245–46. In 
the case of Canada, the tax law was amended to include the new Part XVIII of the 
Income Tax Act to implement the FATCA provisions: see Income Tax Act, supra 
note 58, part XVIII (Enhanced International Information Reporting). See also 
“How to Complete and File a Part XVIII Information Return: International Ex-
change of Information on Financial Accounts Slips and Summary” (last modified 
29 June 2020), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca> [perma.cc/YFG5-
V7ZH]. 
70   For a list of IGAs in force and the links to the IGAs, see US Department of the 
Treasury, “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)” (last modified 26 June 
2019), online (pdf): US Department of the Treasury <www.treasury.gov>  
[perma.cc/H5BY-Q26G]. 
71   See Joshua D Blank & Ruth Mason, “Exporting FATCA” (2014) 142:11 Tax 
Notes 1245. 
72   See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Jersey to Improve International Tax 
Compliance, 22 October 2013, online (pdf): <www.gov.je> [perma.cc/XG76-HLEP]. 
For other similar agreements signed by the United Kingdom, see HM Revenue & 
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United Kingdom transitioned from the pursuit of FATCA-like IGAs to-
ward the OECD CRS.73 
2. Enhanced Corporate Reporting: CbC 
 Another fundamental transformation in the world of tax transparency 
and disclosure has been the implementation of the country-by-country re-
porting obligation for multinationals under the OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting project.74 CbC reporting is a key component of the OECD 
BEPS project, which has now expanded into an “Inclusive Framework” 
involving over 130 countries collaborating and coordinating on measures 
to reduce base erosion and profit shifting by multinationals.75 At its core, 
the goal of BEPS CbC reporting is to provide tax administrations of vari-
ous countries with more complete information about the tax and business 
      
Customs, “Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements: Other UK Agree-
ments” (8 September 2014), online: <www.gov.uk> [perma.cc/2GBA-7D8X]. In 2015, 
Switzerland signed an automatic exchange agreement covering financial account 
information with the EU and signed a similar agreement with Australia. See EC, 
Amending Protocol to the Agreement between the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Coun-
cil Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest pay-
ments, [2015] OJ, L 333/12; Swiss Confederation Federal Department of Finance & 
Federal Tax Administration, Press Release, “Switzerland and Australia Sign Joint 
Declaration on Introduction of Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters” 
(3 March 2015), online: State Secretariat for International Finance 
<www.sif.admin.ch> [perma.cc/56CK-55P4]. 
73   See Government of Jersey, “UK FATCA: The Inter-governmental Agreement (IGA) 
with the UK” (last visited 16 July 2019), online: gov.je <www.gov.je> [perma.cc/ 
D3G3-PS5N] (outlining the history of the UK and Jersey negotiation of an IGA and 
the eventual move to CRS compliance as their agreed mechanism for automatic 
exchange). 
74   See OECD, “Country-by-Country Reporting” (last visited 17 July 2019), online: 
OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/6BWK-KMTW]. See also OECD, Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13: 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD, 2015) at 20–21, 
online: <www.oecd-ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/MND5-N7JT] [OECD, Action 13 Final Re-
port]. 
75   See e.g. OECD, “OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS” (last visited 9 June 2020), 
online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/N8FY-G4EB] (providing an overview of 
the Inclusive Framework in the context of BEPS); OECD, “Members of the OECD/G20 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS” (December 2019), online (pdf): OECD  <www.oecd.org> 
[perma.cc/H5NX-64GS]; OECD, “OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: 
Public Consultation Document: Review of Country-by-Country Reporting (BEPS Action 
13)” (6 February 2020–6 March 2020), online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [per-
ma.cc/B3LA-R5YT] (noting that this consultation document is part of the process 
put in motion by the Inclusive Framework in 2018 in order to assess CbC report-
ing). 
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activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating across borders.76 
In particular, CbC reporting is designed to provide tax authorities with a 
full, global picture of the MNE’s business, as well as detailed information 
about related-party transactions entered into between entities in the cor-
porate structure.77 
 First debuted in Action 13 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan and for-
malized with the OECD’s final report in 2015,78 CbC reporting includes 
three documents prepared by the taxpayer annually: (1) a master file (a 
high-level blueprint of the business that identifies its organizational 
structure, business categories, intangibles, intercompany financial activi-
ty, and its tax and financial situation); (2) a local file (a more detailed look 
at the MNE’s activities in a particular jurisdiction, with a focus on data 
connected to related-party transactions); and (3) a country-by-country 
template.79 
 The country-by-country template is the most controversial element80 
of BEPS CbC reporting and consists of a schedule documenting eight 
basic categories of information for the MNE in that particular jurisdic-
tion.81 A country in which the MNE had operations would receive the 
master file, the local file for that jurisdiction, and the CbC template. Alt-
hough the master file and local file would be delivered directly, the gen-
eral expectation is that the CbC template would be prepared and deliv-
ered by the MNE parent to its home jurisdiction, which would then share 
the report with other jurisdictions in which the MNE operates, pursuant 
to competent authority agreements governing the exchange of reports.82 
 
76   See OECD, “Country-by-Country Reporting”, supra note 74; OECD, Action 13 Fi-
nal Report, supra note 74 at 16. See generally Arthur J Cockfield & Carl 
D MacArthur, “Country-by-Country Reporting and Commercial Confidentiality” 
(2015) 63:3 Can Tax J 627. 
77   See OECD, Action 13 Final Report, supra note 74. 
78   See ibid. 
79   See ibid at 14–16. 
80   See e.g.  OECD, “Public Comments Received, Volume I—Letters A to C: Discussion 
Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CBC Reporting” (23 February 2014), 
online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/HJ68-RSEP]. 
81   The categories include in-country revenue, earnings before taxes, cash tax, current 
year tax accruals, state capital, accumulated earnings, employee headcount, and 
tangible assets (see OECD, Action 13 Final Report, supra note 74 at 29). 
82   Canada revised its Income Tax Act in 2016 to help implement country-by-country re-
porting: see Income Tax Act, supra note 58, s 233.8. See generally Oladiwura Ayeyemi 
Eyitayo, “Profit Shifting by Canadian Multinational Corporations: Prospects of Rever-
sal Under Canada’s Country-by-Country Reporting Rules” (2018) 26 Dal J Leg Stud 79. 
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3. Other Reporting Requirements 
 Although automatic exchange of information (through CRS and 
FATCA) and the BEPS CbC have been the most high-profile products of 
the marked shift in tax transparency and disclosure, other reforms should 
be noted as well. 
 Tax Rulings. In 2015, the EU introduced automatic exchange of cross-
border tax rulings and advance pricing agreements (APAs).83 The new 
disclosure rules served as an acknowledgement that jurisdictions can 
provide advantages to taxpayers indirectly by issuing private tax rul-
ings.84 Although not a new concern, heightened attention to the problem 
of “secret rulings” had followed the Lux Leaks scandal in November 
2014,85 in which the unsanctioned release of Luxembourg tax rulings con-
firmed that the government had offered rulings to multinational taxpay-
ers, enabling them to minimize their taxes in other countries through 
techniques widely viewed as inappropriate tax minimization.  
 EU Amending Directives issued in 2014 and 2015 were direct re-
sponses to these concerns.86 In particular, pursuant to the EU Amending 
Directive of 2015, member states committed to the automatic exchange of 
advance cross-border tax rulings and APAs issued, amended, or renewed 
after December 31, 2016. The commitment to exchange rulings also in-
cluded a plan for the European Commission to establish a secure central 
depository for the exchanged information that would be accessible by the 
Commission and by member states. The European Commission published 
a report in December 2018 on automatic exchange of tax information, not-
ing that “[a]lmost 18,000 rulings were recorded in the central directory in 
2017.”87 
 
83   See EC, Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field 
of taxation, [2015] OJ, L 332/1 at 6 [EU Amending Directive (2015)]. 
84   The current discussion takes place against the backdrop of the EU Code of Con-
duct. 
85   See e.g. Finbarr Bermingham, “Lux Leaks: Juncker Defends Role in Tax Avoid-
ance as Pressure Mounts on President to Resign”, International Business Times 
(12 November 2014), online: <www.ibtimes.co.uk> [perma.cc/MD5F-ZV6D]. See 
generally Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 555–58. For more on the specific Lux Leaks 
documents released, see Marian, supra note 42. 
86   See EU Amending Directive (2015), supra note 83 at 1; EC, Council Directive 
2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, [2014] OJ, 
L 359/1. 
87   EC, European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on overview and assessment of the statistics and information 
on the automatic exchanges in the field of direct taxation, COM(2018) 844 final 
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 Under OECD BEPS Action 5, which is concerned with addressing 
harmful tax practices,88 participating countries have agreed to exchange 
tax rulings, including those related to preferential regimes.89 This Action 
item is one of the four BEPS minimum standards that all members of the 
BEPS Inclusive Framework have committed to implement as part of their 
membership. By December 31, 2018, almost 30,000 tax rulings had been 
exchanged, with 9,000 exchanged in 2018.90 
 Disclosures by Intermediaries or Advisors. More recently, the EU in-
troduced another strand of transparency and disclosure reform, this one 
at the intermediary (advisor) level. In 2018, the EU economic and finance 
ministers adopted a disclosure directive requiring intermediaries that 
provide or design cross-border arrangements bearing specified markers of 
aggressive tax planning to report certain information regarding the tax-
payer’s tax planning activities to tax authorities.91 
 Beneficial Ownership Registries. Globally, the transparency and dis-
closure trend has continued to put pressure on countries to require re-
porting of information on who really controls an entity,92 which would be 
collected into a “beneficial ownership registry.” In 2014, G20 leaders re-
leased a set of “High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transpar-
ency” at their Brisbane summit.93 Following the summit, some countries 
began to develop their own plans for achieving transparency regarding 
      
(Brussels: European Commission, 17 December 2018) at 11, online: <ec.europa.eu> 
[perma.cc/S5WL-HBRB]. 
88   See “Action 5 Harmful Tax Practices” (2019), online: OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/ 
J4UG-RJEL]. 
89   See OECD, Harmful Tax Practices—2018 Peer Review Reports on the Exchange of In-
formation on Tax Rulings: Inclusive Framework on BEPS; Action 5, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD, 2019), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> 
[perma.cc/PG4L-2UMZ]. 
90   See ibid at 13. 
91   See EC, Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field 
of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements, [2018] OJ, L 139/1; 
Taxation and Customs Union, “Transparency for Intermediaries” (last visited 18 
July 2019), online: European Commission <ec.europa.eu> [perma.cc/BJ7V-DWN6]. 
See also Council of the European Union, Press Release, 288/18, “Corporate Tax 
Avoidance: Transparency Rules Adopted for Tax Intermediaries” (25 May 2018), 
online: <www.consilium.europa.eu> [perma.cc/WSK2-JY8C]. 
92   Such beneficial ownership reporting envisions that the ownership or control of an 
entity would look beyond any nominal owners and would identify ultimate owners. 
93   See “G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency” (2014), 
online (pdf): G20 Information Centre <www.g20.utoronto.ca> [perma.cc/JVN4-
FB3R].  
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beneficial ownership.94 Success in implementing a beneficial ownership 
reporting regime is a prong in the Global Forum’s peer review process, 
which evaluates countries’ transparency and disclosure regimes.95  
 Separate from but related to commitments by jurisdictions to collect 
and share information regarding beneficial ownership is the ongoing de-
bate over the degree to which such information should and will be made 
public via a beneficial ownership registry, as opposed to only being pro-
vided to tax authorities of various countries or to other more circum-
scribed audiences. The United Kingdom has been an especially strong ad-
vocate of beneficial ownership reporting requirements and the establish-
ment of public registries. For example, having been the first EU and 
OECD member state to require beneficial ownership reporting through a 
public registry in April 2016,96 the United Kingdom sought—in a some-
what controversial move—to extend comparable reporting obligations to 
British overseas territories through the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laun-
dering Act in 2018 (with actual implementation planned for 2020).97 
 At the EU level, the 2015 Fourth Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Di-
rective gave EU members two years to satisfy several beneficial owner-
ship requirements, including the establishment of a national beneficial 
ownership registry by June 2017.98 While the AML provided some details 
 
94   In November 2015, the United Kingdom released a plan to implement these goals 
primarily through its Money Laundering Regulations: see Cabinet Office, HM 
Revenue & Customs & Prime Minister’s Office, “UK Implementation of the G20 
High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency” (16 November 
2015), online (pdf): GOV.UK <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk> [perma.cc/Q6Q7-
AARL]. Also in 2015, both the United States and Italy released plans for their re-
spective compliance with beneficial ownership goals. See Caroline Atkinson, “The 
U.S. Action Plan to Implement the G-20 High Level Principles on Beneficial Own-
ership” (16 October 2015), online: The White House <obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov> [perma.cc/QVJ5-4TXR]; “Italy Action Plan to Implement the G20 High-Level 
Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency” (last visited 25 July 2019), 
online (pdf): Dipartimento del Tesoro <www.dt.tesoro.it> [perma.cc/TZ9P-YH7D]. 
95   See OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes: Japan 2018 (Second Round), Peer Review Report on the Exchange of In-
formation on Request (Paris: OECD, 2018) at 25, online (pdf): <www.oecd-ilibrary. 
org> [perma.cc/N59K-7P3A].  
96   See The Register of People with Significant Control Regulations 2016 (UK), SI 2016/339.  
97   See Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (UK), s 51. See also Stephanie 
Soong Johnston, “U.K. Lawmakers Urge Action on Public Registries in Territories” 
(2019) 93:8 Tax Notes Intl 885. 
98   See EC, Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, [2015] OJ, L 141/73. 
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on access to the required registry, the Fifth AML, adopted in 2018,99 pro-
vides for access by various actors, including tax authorities, professionals 
with “know your client” duties, and the public, in the case of companies 
(for a fee, but with information limited for privacy reasons).100 
 Non-governmental organizations have advocated for public access to 
beneficial ownership registries as a necessary component of effective re-
gimes for transparency, disclosure, and exchange of information.101 For 
example, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a non-
profit that seeks to improve governance and set standards in the extrac-
tive industry, has been a force for transparency in the extractive industry. 
In 2016, the EITI board specifically tackled the issue of beneficial owner-
ship by adopting a new standard that sets a timeline for its member coun-
tries to implement a publicly available beneficial ownership registry for 
companies in the extractive sector.102  
 EITI member countries have made some progress under the new EITI 
standards. For example, in Nigeria, two parallel projects are underway. 
The first, a joint effort of the EITI and the Nigerian government, is seek-
ing to directly implement the EITI guidelines. The second, a product of 
 
99   See EC, Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, [2018] 
OJ, L 156/43 at 59. 
100  See also Marc Quaghebeur, “Belgium Publishes Decree on Ultimate Beneficial 
Owner Register”, Tax Notes Today International (6 September 2018), online: 
<www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/compliance/belgium-publishes-decree-
ultimate-beneficial-owner-register/2018/09/06/28dd6>. 
101  See Robert Goulder, “Beneficial Ownership and Political Sovereignty: What’s a Tax 
Haven to Do?” (2018) 91:1 Tax Notes Intl 97 at 98. For a sampling of the efforts of 
these organizations to press for various tax changes, including increased transpar-
ency on beneficial ownership, see PwC, “Increasing Role of NGOs” (last visited 25 
July 2019), online: PwC <www.pwc.com> [perma.cc/E8P7-WH77]. These organiza-
tions continue to track the developments globally in the move toward transparency 
and disclosure of beneficial ownership. See e.g. Andres Knobel, Moran Harari & 
Markus Meinzer, “The State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration: A Vis-
ual Overview” (27 June 2018), online (pdf): Tax Justice Network <taxjustice.net> 
[perma.cc/8PSY-7E2U].  
102  The first prong requires countries to generate a roadmap of their plans by January 
1, 2017, and the second requires that they establish the registries by January 1, 
2020. Reflecting the specific concerns of the industry, the registries must include 
all companies that engage in bidding, operating, or investing in extractive assets, 
and the reported data must include ownership levels and details about the mecha-
nisms by which owners exert their ownership or control. Finally, given the political 
and corruption-related risks with extractive industries, the government must in-
clude the identity of political figures with ownership interests in any extractive ac-
tivities. See Nana Ama Sarfo, “Beneficial Ownership Update: Developing Country 
Edition” (2018) 90:13 Tax Notes Intl 1365 at 1366. 
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the Nigerian government’s Corporate Affairs Commission, resulted in Ni-
geria’s joining the Open Government Partnership in December 2016, es-
tablishing a National Action Plan to require registration by December 
2019, and exploring reforms to corporate law to permit public registries.103 
Questions remain, however, including how and whether the reporting re-
gimes will be integrated and how and to what degree corporate compli-
ance will be enforced.104 
 Ghana too has committed to the EITI standard and the Open Owner-
ship Initiative and has introduced new laws that compel companies in 
Ghana to provide ownership and control information. The laws also re-
quire that data to be released in a public registry. Although the new laws 
were passed in 2016, they have not yet been implemented.105 Kenya simi-
larly enacted legal reforms to require a beneficial ownership registry.106  
 Aspirations to transparency have not, however, been universally em-
braced. Unlike Ghana and Nigeria, Kenya did not join the EITI.107 Brazil, 
another significant extractive industries jurisdiction, is similarly not part 
of EITI. Brazil does have a registry, but access is limited to government 
authorities, and there are no plans for the registry to be made available to 
the public.108 On the issue of beneficial ownership registries, results and 
commitments also vary by country. The United States, for example, lags 
behind the United Kingdom and others on the issue of public beneficial 
ownership registries,109 and this comparative lack of transparency has led 
to criticism that the United States is now an appealing tax haven.110  
 
103  See ibid at 1367. 
104  See ibid. 
105  See ibid at 1367–68. 
106  See e.g. Mahesh Acharya & Faith Chebet, “Kenya’s New Companies (Beneficial Own-
ership Information) Regulations” (20 March 2020), online: mondaq <www.mondaq. 
com> [perma.cc/39BF-4UUJ]. 
107  See Sarfo, supra note 102 at 1368. See also Victor Amadala, “New State Registry to 
Expose Owners of Shadowy Companies”, The Star (13 November 2018) 15, online: 
<www.the-star.co.ke> [perma.cc/CU5K-9DP5] (commenting on the forthcoming 
beneficial ownership registry in Kenya). 
108  See Sarfo, supra note 102 at 1368; OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Ex-
change of Information for Tax Purposes: Brazil 2018 (Second Round), Peer Review 
Report on the Exchange of Information Request (Paris: OECD, 2018) at 45–58, 
online: <www.oecd-ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/RM3A-LD47]. 
109  See e.g. Sarfo, supra note 102 at 1366; Ken Silva, “Push for Beneficial Ownership Reg-
ister Gaining Steam in the US” (2019) 56 Cayman Financial Rev 12. 
110  See e.g. Letter from John Penrose MP, Prime Minister’s Anti-Corruption Champion, to 
Senators Mike Crapo and Sherrod Brown (4 June 2020) reprinted in “U.K. Calls on 
U.S. Lawmakers to Implement Company Beneficial Ownership Register”, Tax Notes 
Today International (4 June 2020), online: <www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
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C. Politics, Technology, and Law: Intersecting Forces in the Information 
Revolution 
 The foregoing discussion identified some of the key historical events 
and actors that facilitated the transformation from a world in which in-
formation exchange on request combined with weak third-party reporting 
and taxpayer self-reporting was the norm, to one in which automatic ex-
change and extensive global and ongoing corporate reporting now take 
centre stage. As noted, these revolutionary changes are expected to pro-
foundly impact tax compliance and enforcement.  
 Our account highlights how the tax information revolution was made 
possible through the confluence of technological and political shifts, both 
of which were necessary in generating legal transformation. Computeri-
zation and digitization were certainly necessary prerequisites; however, 
while important in the story, it is unlikely that these advances alone 
would have been adequate to lead to global transformation. The mere ca-
pacity to gather, process, store, share, and use data and information does 
not inherently provide the incentive and commitment to do so. Instead, 
changing political forces, both on national and global levels, were also in-
strumental in bringing about the information revolution and reconstitut-
ing a different vision of how information sharing and tax administration 
might be done between and among nation-states.111  
 More specifically, the move to information exchange, transparency, 
and disclosure required that information and transparency in the inter-
ests of tax enforcement become policy priorities relative to competing in-
terests such as allowing economic competition using nation-states’ tax 
systems (i.e., tax competition) or protecting taxpayer privacy. The latter 
two interests are not trivial, so this reshuffling of political priorities was 
      
international/information-disclosure/uk-calls-us-lawmakers-implement-company-
beneficial-ownership-register/2020/06/08/2cllj?highlight=John%20Penrose> (urging the 
United States to implement a beneficial ownership register and citing benefits the 
United Kingdom experienced from its new register). 
111  That said, the underlying technical infrastructure and its coordination are an es-
sential component of the envisioned global practice of the creation, reporting, and 
sharing of information under the CbC mechanism. For example, in September 
2017, the OECD updated the standardized electronic format for exchange of CbC 
reports between jurisdictions to enable reporting MNEs to clarify, among other 
items, which entities are stateless and which income is stateless. The OECD CbC 
reporting system also includes a “CbC Status Message XML Schema” that enables 
the competent authority to report file and/or correction-related record errors and to 
provide status updates to the MNEs filing a CbC report. See OECD, Country-by-
Country Reporting Status Message XML Schema: User Guide for Tax Administra-
tions (Paris: OECD, September 2017), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/ 
K2M4-UHNX]. 
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no easy feat. As the preceding discussion showed, reshuffling was able to 
occur due to three major factors.  
 First, the obstacles encountered by the OECD’s tax competition pro-
ject in the 1990s and early 2000s (and, in particular the widespread rejec-
tion of a minimum tax rate as a policy solution) were important in initial-
ly framing exchange of information as a more palatable and feasible re-
sponse compared to the harmful tax competition frame. Second, a series 
of high-profile leaks and hacks of tax information between 2008 and 2016 
helped generate the political awareness and outrage necessary for en-
forcement to become a priority. As we have argued elsewhere, these tax 
leaks were widely acknowledged and referred to by tax officials and policy 
makers as key drivers of major tax transparency and disclosure reforms 
such as FATCA, CRS, and BEPS CbC reporting.112 Third, the impetus for 
reform was further fuelled by financial crisis. These factors together im-
pelled and enabled governments and international organizations to press 
for reforms and the introduction of automatic information exchange, 
widespread taxpayer disclosure obligations under threat of significant 
penalties, and extensive corporate reporting. While the core ideas in each 
of these reforms were not entirely new, the political momentum to push 
them forward was. And, while we do not claim that these were the only 
factors creating the political shift or that any one factor was necessarily 
pivotal, what is clear is that a threshold level of political will was neces-
sary for the shift to take hold. Even when it did, it took over a decade for 
the end results of the information revolution to solidify. 
 Importantly, these shifts in political will and momentum were facili-
tated by robust traditional news reporting offering vivid details of tax 
evasion scandals and tax minimization schemes.113 They were also 
nudged along by efforts by non-governmental organizations—such as the 
Tax Justice Network and Oxfam—to frame the conversation in terms of 
 
112  See Oei & Ring, supra note 2; Oei, supra note 13 at 671–73. See also US, Senate Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations, 110th Cong, Staff Report on Tax Haven 
Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance (17 July 2008), online: <www.hsgac.senate.gov> 
[perma.cc/K7AR-2ZU3]. 
113  See e.g. Browning, “Banking Scandal Unfolds”, supra note 41; Lynnley Browning, “Ex-
Banker from UBS Is Indicted in Tax Case”, The New York Times (14 May 2008), online: 
<www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/9M6G-GVRF]. Several months earlier, the IRS an-
nounced that it was commencing enforcement actions against more than one hundred 
taxpayers with accounts in a Liechtenstein bank (see IRS, News Release, IR-2008-26, 
“IRS and Tax Treaty Partners Targeting Liechtenstein Accounts” (26 February 2008), 
online: <www.irs.gov> [perma.cc/8ZB4-2CBY]; Randall Jackson, “The Mouse that 
Roared: Liechtenstein’s Tax Mess” (2008) 49:9 Tax Notes Intl 707). 
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tax abuse and tax justice.114 Widespread and continuing coverage of indi-
vidual tax abuse and corporate tax minimization and elimination strate-
gies provided fodder for accounts of tax planning excess and tax injustice. 
Organizations of journalists (such as the International Consortium of In-
vestigative Journalists) also played an active role in curating, shaping, 
editorializing, and reporting on the leaks and their implications.115 The 
end result was that countries found themselves under scrutiny and in 
need of a response.116 Countries already in favour of enhanced tax trans-
parency and disclosure reforms seized the opportunity to advocate for le-
gal changes that turned their ideas into functioning law.117 For political 
and other reasons, and through the coordinating work of organizations 
like the G20 and OECD, other countries found themselves swept along for 
the ride.  
 The resulting mix of legal reforms took place on both a national and 
an international level in a way that was deeply intertwined. Some domes-
tic reforms appeared to focus on benefiting the enacting nation-state. For 
example, the 2010 US FATCA legislation imposed requirements on for-
eign financial entities and threatened undesirable US tax consequences 
for failure to comply.118 However, even this seemingly self-contained re-
gime ultimately required international cooperation and the signing of bi-
lateral IGAs to be effective.119 
 Other legal reforms took the form of automatic exchange regimes im-
plemented through the acceptance and adoption of universal substantive 
and technical standards. The OECD’s development of the CRS, and the 
CRS’s formal incorporation into the tax regimes of many jurisdictions 
 
114  See e.g. “Financial Secrecy Index” (last visited 6 March 2019), online: Tax Justice Net-
work <www.financialsecrecyindex.com> [perma.cc/U9P2-4BN3]; “The Politics of Pov-
erty: Tax” (last visited 6 March 2019), online: Oxfam <politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica. 
org> [perma.cc/A6SM-HHMH] (various analyses of the effects of international tax 
avoidance on poverty). 
115  See International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, online: <icij.org> [perma.cc/ 
L4MF-E7CY] (detailing various leak-driven investigations). 
116  See Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 590–600 (detailing different responses of various 
countries to tax leaks). 
117  See ibid. An adjacent question raised by the pressures that some countries experienced 
to adopt various reforms is the role and reality of tax sovereignty in today’s world of in-
ternational tax. For an exploration of this topic, see Sergio André Rocha & Allison 
Christians, eds, Tax Sovereignty in the BEPS Era (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2017). 
118  See IRC §§ 1471–74. 
119  See e.g. Jaime Arora & Shamik Trivedi, “FATCA Reporting Said to Require Com-
pliance Expertise” (2012) 68 Tax Notes Intl 466. See generally Morse, “Ask for 
Help”, supra note 1. 
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(more than one hundred as of June 2019) through their participation in 
the CRS Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement is an example.120 
Similarly, the OECD BEPS project and its action on CbC reporting is an 
example of legal change effectuated through an agreed-upon multilateral 
standard. 
 In short, a confluence of technological and political change has led to a 
series of reforms tantamount to a revolution in tax transparency and in-
formation exchange. Through a combination of laws adopted at the na-
tion-state level, bilateral treaties effectuating these laws, and universal 
standards set by international organizations that are multilaterally 
adopted, countries and international organizations are now making tax 
administration and enforcement decisions against the backdrop of a vast-
ly changed information landscape. While there is no reason to presume 
that the tax information revolution is complete,121 the crucial next ques-
tion is what countries will do with all of the new data and information the 
revolution has generated or will soon generate. 
III.  From Global Information to Domestic Enforcement 
 We now consider what is likely to happen as the revolution turns in-
ward and data “comes home.” The theoretical tax-centric aspiration is, of 
course, that all countries will be better able to enforce the tax law (be-
cause they will now have the information necessary to audit and hold ac-
countable non-compliant taxpayers about whom information was previ-
ously lacking) and to identify taxpayers and transactions not previously 
on the radar of tax authorities. But things are unlikely to be that simple. 
Once tax data comes home, a different mix of political, legal-institutional, 
and technological factors are likely to shape country-level responses to 
and uses of that data. Part IIIA first discusses key concerns surrounding 
country-level uses that are likely to result in divergent domestic trajecto-
ries. Part IIIB then identifies eight key country-level factors and charac-
teristics expected to influence the paths countries take going forward, and 
Part IIIC maps the most likely reactions and responses from other  
countries.   
A. Key Concerns When Data Comes Home 
 There are two dominant concerns with respect to country-level uses of 
exchanged tax data. First, data must be processed and safeguarded, and 
this is a function of technological and technical capabilities, which are not 
 
120  See OECD, “Signatories of the MCAA”, supra note 62. 
121  For example, additional work on beneficial owner registries remains on the table. 
WHEN DATA COMES HOME 737 
 
 
uniform. Second, domestic political forces have the capacity to derail, 
warp, or stymie data uses.  
1. Technical Factors: The Multiple Aspects of Data Use 
 While certain aspects of information exchange may be automatic, the 
ability to use tax data is not. Once a jurisdiction receives tax information, 
it must process and integrate that information into its domestic tax in-
formation, assessment, and enforcement systems, which requires tech-
nical capacity.122 New data must be interpreted and evaluated, again in 
conjunction with existing data. Then, audit and enforcement choices must 
be made in light of new information. Tax policy analysts readily 
acknowledge this reality.123 
 While some information received may be seamlessly translated into 
immediate audit action, other types of information will defy automatic en-
forcement. For instance, information gathered from a CbC report does 
not necessarily identify specific transfer pricing problems or suggest the 
most appropriate legal analysis.124 Assuming jurisdictions comply with 
their stated commitments not to take the CbC information and directly 
assert underpayment of tax, and to instead use the information to launch 
a transfer pricing analysis of the taxpayer,125 the tax administration’s au-
dit capacity is critical. In transfer pricing matters, for example, auditors 
must be able to unravel related-party transactions reported on the tax re-
turn and to work comfortably with multiple transfer pricing methodolo-
gies. Auditors must also have access to adequate comparable arms’ length 
transactions to legitimately challenge related-party transactions. Meeting 
these thresholds will be an issue for tax administrations in developing 
 
122  A related and important issue here is the burden that new transparency and dis-
closure regimes may place on developing countries—particularly to the extent that 
the primary beneficiaries of the regimes could be developed countries. 
123  See e.g. Morse, “Ask for Help”, supra note 1 (discussing how to expand co-operation 
of non-US governments in FATCA enforcement); Foreign Bank Account Reporting 
Hearing, supra note 3 at 60–63 (statement of Dirk JJ Suringa); Thomas Neubig, 
“Global Tax Administration Initiatives Addressing Tax Evasion and Avoidance” 
(2018) 91:11 Tax Notes Intl 1137 at 1141–44 (describing global tax enforcement in-
itiatives that involve capacity building, knowledge sharing, and use of analytics to 
strengthen tax administration). 
124  See OECD, Action 13 Final Report, supra note 74 at 16. 
125  See e.g. OECD, BEPS Action 13 on Country-by Country Reporting: Guidance on the 
Appropriate Use of Information Contained in Country-by-Country Reports, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD, September 2017) at 5, online 
(pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/LD7E-ARE6] (noting that the “ability of a jurisdiction 
to obtain and use CbC Reports is conditional upon it using CbCR information appro-
priately”).  
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countries but will likely be challenging for more developed countries as 
well. 
 Likewise, much of the information received by tax authorities concern-
ing individual taxpayers will not translate into automatic tax return ad-
justments. For example, information received about financial accounts 
and assets says nothing directly about actual income, merely hinting at 
potential gaps in the taxpayer’s reporting and pointing to possible lines of 
inquiry.126 Here again, a tax administration will need legal expertise and 
other sources of information to meaningfully evaluate the information  
received.  
 Tax authorities will also need sufficient resources to enforce the tax 
law, particularly where taxpayers are well-represented enough to chal-
lenge tax authorities at every step of the process. If a tax authority is un-
able to widely enforce against large numbers of taxpayers on the basis of 
the new information flows, it will need to select enforcement targets. 
While selective enforcement is a tactic already utilized domestically in 
light of resource constraints, its risks may be more pronounced in this 
new information world.127 For example, selective enforcement may lead to 
disproportionate harms to certain demographic groups or questionable 
exercises of power.128 Of course, a tax authority’s need for enforcement re-
sources may be somewhat reduced by the deterrence effect of automatic 
information receipt. The positive impacts of third-party reporting on tax 
compliance is a well-recognized reality in tax administration; thus, infor-
mation may deter non-compliance even without further enforcement  
action.129 
 
126  See e.g. Lederman, supra note 4 at 1751; Slemrod et al, supra note 5 at 26. Both 
point out problems with gross receipts reporting in the domestic context. 
127  See generally Andres Knobel & Markus Meinzer, “Automatic Exchange of Information: 
An Opportunity for Developing Countries to Tackle Tax Evasion and Corruption” (June 
2014) at 11–12, online (pdf): Tax Justice Network <www.taxjustice.net> [perma.cc/ 
K3HZ-KM7X] (advocating automatic exchange of information as an important tool for 
developing countries in curbing corruption and tax evasion and contending that broad-
er transparency of tax data can help ensure proper use of the data). 
128  See Part III.A.2.c., below. See e.g. National Taxpayer Advocate, “2013 Annual Report 
to Congress: Volume One” (31 December 2013) at 229, online (pdf): National Tax-
payer Advocate <taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov> [perma.cc/H9GW-KBPV] (contending 
that the IRS’s offshore voluntary disclosure program is “a good deal for ‘bad actors’ but 
not for ‘benign actors’”). But see Nicholas Shaxson, “Five Myths about Tax Havens”, 
The Washington Post (15 April 2016), online: <www.washingtonpost.com> [per-
ma.cc/P4J8-B45H] (resisting arguments that tax havens protect taxpayers against 
“despotic” governments). 
129  See Morse, Karlinsky & Bankman, supra note 5 at 39–40 (noting the expectation 
that taxpayers are more likely to report income for which there is a clear paper 
trail). 
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 Finally, decisions must be made regarding how newly available data 
is safeguarded against breach or other misuse. Data protection is the 
product of resources, process, and commitments, and is susceptible to 
weaknesses in any of the three.130 While data protection is certainly al-
ready an issue in within-country tax administration, the global nature of 
the new information reporting and the multiple different parties collect-
ing, transmitting, and storing information creates heightened risks and 
infuses the conversation with greater urgency.  
 Not surprisingly, the major initiatives in the global information revo-
lution—CRS, FATCA, and CbC reporting—have been accompanied by ex-
tensive discussion of how to safeguard data and have resulted in the in-
clusion of rules and procedures to accomplish this. For example, in CbC 
information exchange, the MNE’s home jurisdiction undertakes to ex-
change the CbC report provided by the MNE with jurisdictions with 
which it has signed a competent authority agreement to exchange CbC 
reports.131 The most common vehicle for these competent authority 
agreements has been reliance on the exchange of CbC reports under the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance (MCMAA), 
which has been signed by eighty-six jurisdictions as of  July 23, 2020.132 
Among the agreed terms of the CbC MCMAA is a provision guaranteeing 
that “[a]ll information exchanged is subject to the confidentiality rules 
and other safeguards provided for in the Convention, including the provi-
sions limiting the use of the information exchanged.”133 In addition, the 
CbC MCMAA provides limits on the use of the exchanged information, 
anticipating likely abuses, including abuses by tax authorities them-
 
130  See e.g. Michael Hatfield, “Cybersecurity and Tax Reform” (2018) 93:4 Ind LJ 1161  
(reviewing a range of factors at issue in tax administration cybersecurity in the United 
States). 
131  See OECD, Action 13: Guidance on the Implementation of Transfer Pricing Docu-
mentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project (Paris: OECD, 2015) at 6, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/ 
JY7B-WXL7]. As a first step, multinational corporations are required to submit their 
CbC reports to the home jurisdiction of the parent entity pursuant to domestic CbC leg-
islation enacted by that jurisdiction. 
132  See OECD, “Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 
the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports (CbC MCAA) and Signing Dates” 
(last modified 23 July 2020), online (pdf): OECD <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/6WTX-
MDZG]. Note that the multilateral CAA for exchange of the CbC reports is sepa-
rate from the multilateral CAA with respect to exchange of financial account in-
formation (part of the Common Reporting Standard). 
133  Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country 
Reports, s 5(1), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/6MC7-2EJL] [CbC MCAA]. 
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selves.134 For example, in light of taxpayer concerns that tax authorities 
receiving the exchanged information will use it as the basis for an almost 
automatic transfer pricing tax adjustment, the CbC MCMAA specifies 
that exchanged information must only be used for high-level assessments 
of transfer pricing risk, and that any tax adjustments should be the result 
of further individualized analysis of the taxpayer’s transactions, including 
a complete functional analysis and a “full comparability analysis.”135 
 Whether countries are willing and able to fully comply with these 
commitments remains to be seen. Moreover, there may be disagreement 
as to what constitutes sufficient and appropriate compliance. While data 
and information exchange risks were certainly present prior to CbC re-
porting, the volume, type, and organization of the information exchanged 
via the CbC reporting mechanism is likely to result in heightened risks of 
breach and misuse.   
 What is clear from the preceding discussion is that all of these ac-
tions—data processing and integration, enforcement action, and data 
safeguards—will require reliance on various procedures and protocols, 
and that all of this demands a mix of technological sophistication, tech-
nical infrastructure, and ongoing dialogue and coordination with other in-
formation sources. Shortages or weaknesses in any of these aspects can 
block or diminish effective data use. While the challenges faced by devel-
oping countries may be particularly acute, these nation-states will not be 
the only ones experiencing resource and infrastructure constraints in tax 
administration. More developed economies may also struggle with some 
or all of these elements. A big unanswered question going forward is to 
what degree tax administrations are capable of meeting this challenge. 
2. Domestic Politics in the Implementation Phase 
 A second category of factors affecting domestic implementation are the 
realities of domestic politics. Politics affects available technological and 
technical capacities and resources and also shapes national priorities, 
public opinions, and outcomes. Notably, international commitments to 
provide and deliver information impose no duty on the state itself to use 
 
134  See e.g. Mark Nehoray, Jeroen Lemmens & Yoshihiro Adachi, “Transfer Pricing Doc-
umentation and Country-by-Country Reporting” (November 2015) at 3–4, online (pdf): 
Deloitte <www2.deloitte.com> [perma.cc/YYV3-XA7K]. 
135  CbC MCAA, supra note 133, s 5(2). See also OECD, BEPS Action 13 Country-by-
Country Reporting: Handbook on Effective Tax Risk Assessment (Paris: OECD, 
September 2017) at 49, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/ZEW8-4UN5]; Ali-
son Lobb & Christa Silverthorne, “First Automatic CbC Report Exchanges to Trig-
ger Tax Authority Risk Assessments”, International Tax Review (13 August 2018), 
online: <www.internationaltaxreview.com> [perma.cc/NRW8-RQUD]. 
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the data. Therefore, there is significant room for politics and national pri-
orities to shape how information is used in different jurisdictions and for 
domestic outcomes to vary dramatically.  
 Three potentially concerning outcomes that may arise when data 
comes home to various countries are domestic resistance to data use 
(which might occur for various reasons), politicized uses of data, and un-
fairness and targeting in how data is used.    
a. Domestic Resistance 
  There are two related features of how the global tax information 
revolution unfolded that suggest that the possibility of divergent domestic 
trajectories should not be wholly surprising. First, it cannot be empha-
sized enough that the tax information revolution was at least partially 
driven by outrage over illegal tax avoidance and excessive tax minimiza-
tion behaviours revealed through data leaks and hacks, with economic 
and financial crisis heightening such outrage. In light of this, the political 
and legal responses culminating in the information revolution inevitably 
contained an expressive and reactive component. As a result, it is not un-
reasonable to think that some countries may have enacted or agreed to 
frameworks, treaties, and domestic laws in part because they felt com-
pelled, pressured, or shocked into responding, rather than due to any in-
herent longstanding commitments to the information project.  
 Second, and relatedly, much of the response was driven by countries 
for whom preserving the tax base (at least in terms of optics) was a priori-
ty. The United States, for example, employs worldwide taxation of the in-
come of US persons (generally citizens, permanent residents, and others 
meeting a substantial presence threshold), including income generated 
from assets wherever held, and irrespective of the individual’s residence. 
Thus, detecting and taxing offshore assets and income was a US policy 
priority. Similarly, the ability to tax the income of US and other multina-
tionals has been a priority for several EU countries. These powerful de-
veloped countries were able to deploy their position within international 
economic, political, and cultural networks to get other countries to accept 
the global information revolution (for example, by linking cooperation to 
banking access or other resources).  
 The confluence of these two related factors suggests that a variety of 
countries that may have been less concerned with tax base preservation, 
may have had less interest in obtaining tax data, or may have had differ-
ing levels of tax administrative capacity and ability to safeguard infor-
mation now find themselves in the position of having signed on to the in-
formational and transparency framework despite relative disinterest or 
even countervailing or conflicting interests. It would therefore be naïve to 
imagine that data uses would not vary among these differently situated 
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countries when data comes home. In short, the mere fact that the collec-
tive effect of political will on a global level produced the information revo-
lution does not imply uniform agreement with the agenda and does not 
prevent domestic political and other forces from derailing the revolution 
in practice or from redirecting data to unintended uses or non-uses. 
 Domestic resistance may manifest in a number of ways. First, there 
may be domestic resistance to data collection and usage. The possibility of 
such resistance was previewed by the fact that various constituencies 
have already objected as the international community worked its way to-
ward putting in place the new regimes.136 The primary objections articu-
lated,137 directly or indirectly, include (1) a desire to limit “big” govern-
ment, (2) an emphasis on privacy,138 (3) an emphasis on taxpayer rights, 
(4) a lack of confidence in government, and (5) a desire to minimize taxes. 
There is every reason to believe that these actors, having lost the battle 
on the global stage, will revisit their arguments and strategies at the do-
mestic implementation stage.  
 Not all strands of domestic resistance are necessarily negative. For 
example, one emerging issue is taxpayer rights.139 The concept of taxpay-
ers having rights vis-à-vis the government in the context of imposition 
and collection of taxes is certainly not new.140 However, a trend has 
 
136   See e.g. Jason J Fichtner & Adam N Michel, “The OECD’s Conquest of the United 
States: Under the Costs and Consequences of the BEPS Project and Tax Harmoniza-
tion” (March 2016) at 30–31, online (pdf): Mercatus Center <www.mercatus.org>  
[perma.cc/2YTR-NEF4] (reviewing a wide range of objections to the OECD BEPS pro-
ject, including particular objections to CbC reporting). 
137  See e.g. ibid; William G Gale, “Don’t Buy the Sales Tax” (1 March 1998), online: Brook-
ings <www.brookings.edu> [perma.cc/5PKS-AEZ4] (noting the appeal to some taxpay-
ers of any system that could eliminate the need for an income tax and the IRS); Arthur 
J Cockfield, “Cross-Border Big Data Flows and Taxpayer Privacy” in Robert F van 
Brederode, ed, Ethics and Taxation  (Singapore: Springer, 2020) 379 at 387–88 [Cock-
field, “Cross-Border”] (detailing an array of privacy concerns with information ex-
change, including kidnapping, political reprisals, and access to data by national com-
petitors). 
138  In this regard, ongoing debates about privacy and emerging norms in an era of 
widespread data may collaterally influence debates about tax information and tax 
transparency and disclosure. 
139  See Irma Mosquera Valderrama et al, “The Rule of Law and the Effective Protection of 
Taxpayers' Rights in Developing Countries” (2017) WU International Taxation Re-
search Paper Series Working Paper 2017-10, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3034360>. 
140  For example, many of the elements outlined for the practical protection of taxpayers’ 
rights include elements familiar in many tax systems, such as confidentiality, audit 
rules, and appeals processes: see IBFD, “Observatory on the Protection of Taxpayers’ 
Rights: 2018 General Report on the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights” (2019) at 26, 
online (pdf): International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation <www.ibfd.org> [perma.cc/ 
X845-GMXY]. 
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emerged in recent years focusing on protection of taxpayer rights, trig-
gered in part by concerns over governments’ growing investigative, data 
collection, and enforcement powers in the global effort to curb tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. For example, the International Bureau of Fiscal Doc-
umentation launched its “Observatory on the Protection of Taxpayers’ 
Rights.”141 This platform builds142 on minimum standards and best prac-
tices for taxpayer rights protection articulated during the 2015 Interna-
tional Fiscal Association Congress on “The Practical Protection of Tax-
payers’ Rights.”143 In part, research and advocacy regarding taxpayers’ 
rights frame the analysis in terms of human rights and work to develop 
principles, minimum standards, and best practices144 and to monitor their 
status through national reports.145 
 The concern with taxpayers’ rights is connected to taxpayer privacy 
concerns, and a number of scholars have evaluated the risks of the new 
initiatives through a taxpayer rights and privacy lens.146 Prescriptive so-
lutions stemming from a taxpayer rights perspective may, however, look a 
bit different. For example, they have included recommendations for a 
multijurisdictional taxpayer bill of rights.147  
 Importantly, there is no inherent clash between taxpayers’ rights or 
taxpayer privacy movements and the revolution in cross-border tax in-
formation exchange. In fact, a widely adopted and universally supported 
 
141  See “Observatory on the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights” (last visited 30 July 2020), 
online: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation <www.ibfd.org> [perma.cc/ 
9M2Y-4DQL] [IBFD, “Observatory”]. 
142  See “National Reports for the Observatory for the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights” (last 
visited 6 August 2020), online: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
<www.ibfd.org> [perma.cc/8BNV-9J8H] [IBFD, “National Reports”] (noting the role of 
the IFA Congress). 
143  “IFA 2015 Congress Basel, Switzerland”, online: International Fiscal Association 
<ifa.nl/congresses/ifa-2015-basel> [perma.cc/QRQ2-8YJR] (Subject 2 of the Scientific 
Programme examined “[t]he practical protection of taxpayers’ fundamental rights”). 
144  See IBFD, “Observatory”, supra note 141.  
145  See IBFD, “National Reports”, supra note 142. 
146  See e.g. Arthur J Cockfield, “How Countries Should Share Tax Information” (2017) 
50:5 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L 1091; Arthur J Cockfield, “Protecting Taxpayer Privacy 
Rights Under Enhanced Cross-Border Tax Information Exchange: Toward a Multilat-
eral Taxpayer Bill of Rights” (2010) 42:2 UBC L Rev 419 [Cockfield, “Protecting Tax-
payer Privacy”]; Allison Christians, “Taxpayer Rights in Canada” in César Alejandro 
Ruiz Jiménez, ed, Derecho Tributario y Derechos Humanos: Diálogo en México y el 
Mundo [Tax Law and Human Rights: Dialogue in Mexico and the World] (Mexico City: 
Tirant lo Blanch, 2016) 485; Niels Diepvens & Filip Debelva, “The Evolution of the Ex-
change of Information in Direct Tax Matters: The Taxpayer’s Rights Under Pressure” 
(2015) 24:4 EC Tax Rev 210.  
147  See e.g. Cockfield, “Protecting Taxpayer Privacy”, supra note 146. 
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set of taxpayer rights protection standards could reduce concerns about 
taxpayer privacy that might otherwise foment domestic resistance to ex-
change of information. Nonetheless, in some political settings, movements 
associated with taxpayers’ rights and privacy concerns could ultimately 
shift the balance of support for global transparency and information initi-
atives, and may impact domestic uses and implementation. 
 Another possibility is that governments may simply be disinterested 
in acting on received data and information, perhaps viewing cross-border 
enforcement as a low priority, or perhaps for other reasons. This has cer-
tainly occurred in the past. For example, in the case of leaked data con-
cerning HSBC Swiss private bank clients that was originally obtained by 
France in 2009, some governments initially failed to act despite the data’s 
availability.148 The leaked data was originally received and decrypted by 
the French government in 2009, revealing information regarding 127,000 
accounts and 79,000 individuals from across the globe.149 France made the 
data available to a number of countries, but not all acted swiftly on the 
data. For example, Denmark did not request the HSBC Swiss data from 
France, despite knowing that its own taxpayers’ hidden accounts were on 
the list, until the data was published by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists on their website on February 8, 2015.150 The 
next day, the Danish tax authorities announced that they were request-
ing the names of Danish taxpayers with HSBC Swiss accounts from 
France.151 Danish tax authorities also confirmed that they had not previ-
ously sought the data from France (despite the fact that France had 
shared the HSBC lists with other countries) and launched an investiga-
tion into why the information had not been requested by Denmark  
earlier.152 
 Regardless of the reasons for resistance, the levers of domestic politi-
cal influence are the same: resources and law. Most obviously, the impact 
of information flows can be blunted by limiting the resources available to 
 
148  See Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 548–50. 
149  See Randall Jackson, “France to Investigate Possible Tax Cheats Listed in Stolen 
HSBC Data”, Tax Notes Today International (20 April 2010), online: 
<www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/assets-wealth-taxation/france-
investigate-possible-tax-cheats-listed-stolen-hsbc-data/2010/04/20/193f6> [Jackson, 
“France to Investigate”]. 
150 See e.g. “Denmark Ignored Hidden Swiss Fortunes for Years,” The Local (9 February 
2015), online: <www.thelocal.dk/> [perma.cc/MMD5-T2EE] (Danish tax minister quot-
ed as saying he did not understand why his predecessor did not act on the HSBC in-
formation available from the French government but that he was now acting). 
151  See “Denmark Seeks Names of HSBC Swiss Account Holders”, Reuters (9 Febru-
ary 2015), online: <www.reuters.com> [perma.cc/CY72-NPJ3]. 
152  See ibid; “Denmark Ignored Hidden Swiss Fortunes for Years”, supra note 150. 
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the tax administration in budget allocations. In jurisdictions such as the 
United States, where the tax enforcement agency has been under political 
siege for almost two decades, domestic actors eager to limit the power of 
information exchange can tap into an existing political narrative to re-
strict agency funding and ensure limited enforcement. Even in jurisdic-
tions where the tax enforcement agency has not been the subject of such 
recent critiques, efforts to increase funding to address what are likely to 
be enhanced needs for resources can be the object of intense lobbying. The 
new world of more institutionalized data transmission raises the stakes of 
such lobbying. Ultimately, domestic political efforts to defund enforcement 
can have virtually the same effect as not having the information at all. 
b. Politicized Uses and Non-Uses 
 There is also potential for politicized or inappropriate use or non-use 
of data. Opponents of expanded global information reporting have regu-
larly identified the risk of inappropriate data use by jurisdictions as a ma-
jor risk accompanying the new data flows.153 
 The most obvious example would be the use of data for illegitimate po-
litical or economic purposes by those in power—for instance, to persecute 
or undermine opponents. The most egregious opportunities for such con-
duct may be constrained by both domestic and international rules. On the 
domestic side, rules barring disclosure of and access to taxpayer data 
without a legitimate enforcement purpose may limit such abuse.154 On the 
international side, there are rules embedded within the new information 
regimes that limit information exchange to jurisdictions that demonstrate 
a satisfactory commitment to standards of data use and protection identi-
fied by the global community.155 But even with such rules, there are still 
risks of inappropriate uses, for example in democracies “at the edge”—
that is, those countries able to currently meet global standards for partic-
ipating in the information revolution but that nonetheless present clear 
risks of misuse and misappropriation of tax data. 
 
153 See e.g. Fichtner & Michel, supra note 136 at 31; Cockfield, “Cross-Border”, supra 
note 137 at 387–88 (detailing an array of privacy concerns with information exchange 
including kidnapping, political reprisals, and access to data by national competitors). 
154 See e.g. IRS, “IRS Privacy Policy” (last modified 31 January 2020), online: IRS 
<irs.gov> [perma.cc/8YF2-389L]; IRS, “Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide,” 
Pub 4639 (2012), online (pdf): IRS <irs.gov> [perma.cc/M936-RNQG]; CbC MCAA,  
supra note 133, ss 5(1)–(3) (imposing requirements on countries to address concerns 
regarding confidentiality, safeguarding of data, appropriate uses of exchanged infor-
mation). 
155  See e.g. the text accompanying notes 133–35. 
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 Perhaps more pervasive is the risk that governments will use in-
formation in ways that are legal, yet advance political or other interests 
beyond tax enforcement. In these contexts, it may be difficult to draw 
lines between legitimate and illegitimate uses. For example, the United 
States has long been familiar with the option of relying on criminal tax 
enforcement as a tool to indict and punish individuals whose more notori-
ous crimes lie beyond the tax system. In a widely known example dating 
to the 1930s, the United States relied on the tax system to imprison noto-
rious organized crime leader Al Capone.156 As characterized in a July 
1931 letter from three internal revenue agents to the agent in charge in 
Chicago, Capone was “the boss of the so-called Cicero syndicate which 
carried on a very lucrative business in manufacturing and selling beer 
and alcohol, operating gambling houses, and houses of prostitution.”157 
Capone had avoided arrest and prosecution for this assortment of crimi-
nal activities, allegedly due to successful efforts at bribing local police.158 
Ultimately, Capone was charged and convicted on five counts of tax eva-
sion and was sentenced to eleven years in prison (of which he served 
eight).159 Although novel at the time, the use of tax prosecutions as a 
backstop for failed convictions on other substantive criminal charges (re-
ferred to by some as “pretextual criminal tax prosecutions”) has become a 
familiar, though contested, enforcement practice.160  
 Most recently, the conviction of President Donald Trump’s campaign 
chair, Paul Manafort, for filing false tax returns and for failing to file a 
foreign bank account report has been characterized by the president as an 
example of pretextual tax prosecution, with Manafort being treated worse 
than Al Capone.161 The counterargument, of course, is that Manafort’s ac-
 
156  See e.g. “Historical Documents Relating to Alphonse (Al) Capone, Chicago” (last 
modified 9 November 2018), online: IRS <www.irs.gov> [perma.cc/8MSN-7RQ2]. 
157  Letter from Internal Revenue Agents WC Hodgins, Jacque L Westrich & HN 
Clagett to the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge, Chicago, Ill (8 July 1931) at 1, 
online: <www.irs.gov> [perma.cc/MFS9-FEZF]. 
158  See ibid at 2. 
159  See Joseph J Thorndike, “Trump Compared Paul Manafort to Al Capone: Here’s 
Why” (2018) 160:8 Tax Notes 1069 at 1073. 
160  See e.g. Daniel C Richman & William J Stuntz, “Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on 
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution” (2005) 105:2 Colum L Rev 583; 
Harry Litman, “Pretextual Prosecution” (2004) 92:6 Geo LJ 1135; Scott D Shimick, 
“Heisenberg’s Uncertainty: An Analysis of Criminal Tax Pretextual Prosecutions 
in the Context of Breaking Bad’s Notorious Anti-Hero” (2014) 50:1 Tulsa L Rev 43. 
161  See Donald J Trump, “Looking back on history, who was treated worse, Alfonse 
Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and “Public Enemy Number One,” or Paul 
Manafort, political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confine-
ment - although convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?” (1 August 
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tivities were connected to elections, political processes, and collusion with 
a foreign government, all serious matters of national interest.  
 Outside the United States, the potential for politics to intersect with 
tax-related prosecutions can be seen in the recent convictions of former 
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was fined and sentenced to 
ten years in prison in 2018 on corruption charges that stemmed from the 
Panama Papers data leak revealing his family’s offshore holdings.162 In 
part, Sharif “failed to disclose the source of funds used to purchase luxurious 
London properties and had not reported them to tax authorities.”163 Follow-
ing the convictions, Sharif and his family members (some of whom were also 
convicted) contended that the charges were “politically motivated.”164 
 These examples illustrate the ways in which tax prosecutions can 
move into the political arena. The question is at what point we might be-
come concerned that such tax prosecutions could constitute an inappro-
priate use of the tax enforcement power and an illegitimate use of tax da-
ta. Perhaps an even more serious issue is not whether the Manafort or 
Sharif convictions are problematic, but rather whether we can envision 
circumstances in which tax information and enforcement are used as in-
appropriate political leverage. Although this possibility has long existed, 
the risk may prove greater in an era in which much more data is much 
more readily available and encompasses a far greater number of taxpay-
ers. To the extent that some level of a tax “smoking gun” could be found in 
such volumes of tax data, the risk of inappropriate use increases, and the 
need to identify the boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate 
use correspondingly intensifies. 
 Another possibility is that political considerations may drive non-use 
of data. An example of this sort of politically driven procedural improprie-
ty can be seen in the example of leaked data concerning HSBC Swiss pri-
vate bank clients that was originally obtained by the French government 
in 2009.165 As discussed above, France shared the data with a number of 
countries, including Greece, providing then Finance Minister George Pa-
      
2018 at 8:35), online: Twitter <twitter.com> [perma.cc/2RH9-PF2X]. See also 
Thorndike, supra note 159 at 1069. 
162  See Scilla Alecci, “Former Pakistan PM Sharif Sentenced to 10 Years over Panama 
Papers”, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (6 July 2018), 
online: <www.icij.org> [perma.cc/23KP-AMNS]. 
163  Reuters, “Pakistan Court Sentences Ex-PM Sharif to 10 Years in Prison for Cor-
ruption”, NBC News (6 July 2018), online: <www.nbcnews.com> [perma.cc/6URQ-
6U8X]. 
164  See Alecci, supra note 162. 
165  See Jackson, “France to Investigate”, supra note 149; Oei & Ring, supra note 2 
at 548–50. 
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paconstantinou with a list (known as the “Lagarde list”) of Greek taxpay-
ers and their information.166 Later investigations revealed that Papacon-
stantinou first scrubbed the data of the names of family members before 
sending the list on to the Greek finance ministry’s Financial and Econom-
ic Crime Unit.167 Ultimately, Papaconstantinou was convicted for having 
deleted his family members’ names from the Lagarde list.168 This episode 
illustrates the risk that those in power may act to ensure personally bene-
ficial outcomes, and it also serves as a reminder that the fact that data 
might be available does not guarantee that all cases will be pursued.  
c. Unfairness or Mistargeting 
 Another potential outcome when data comes home is the enactment of 
laws or development of enforcement policies that are unfair or distribu-
tively problematic, even if such policies are legally permissible. At its 
core, a significant change in global transparency and exchanged infor-
mation is an information shock that will necessarily have distributive 
consequences. On the one hand, to the extent that sophisticated and high-
net-worth taxpayers are held more accountable for tax compliance, we 
may see fairer and more distributively just outcomes. On the other hand, 
there are countervailing risks, such as risks of unintended populations 
bearing the brunt of stepped up enforcement, or risks that among taxpay-
ers whose data is contained in the new pool of tax information, those who 
are less sophisticated may be disproportionately targeted. In this way, 
even though there may be enforcement and compliance gains in light of 
more transparency and information, the enforcement impacts may hold 
regressive elements. 
 For example, it is well known that following tax leaks in 2008, the 
United States enacted the new FATCA legislation and tax administration 
programs geared toward punishing taxpayers who had hidden assets in 
foreign jurisdictions.169 As part of its enforcement strategy, the United 
States enacted significant new reporting requirements and engaged in 
enhanced enforcement of new and existing reporting requirements.170 Re-
latedly, the IRS introduced the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program 
 
166  See Randall Jackson, “Tax Evasion Scandal Erupts Amid Revenue Shortfall” 
(2013) 69:2 Tax Notes Intl 147 at 148 (the list included 2,509 Greek taxpayers with 
“secret” offshore holdings in HSBC totalling up to $1.95 billion). 
167  See ibid. 
168  See Teri Sprackland, “German State to Train Greek Tax Collectors” (2016) 81:4 
Tax Notes Intl 307 at 307. 
169  See Oei, supra note 13 at 674ff. 
170  See Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 601–603. 
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(OVDP), which allowed eligible taxpayers who had failed to properly re-
port their offshore accounts to come clean and pay penalties but avoid any 
criminal charges.171  
 While the FATCA legislation and associated enforcement initiatives 
have certainly had the effect of holding offshore tax cheats more account-
able for their tax crimes, the evidence also suggests that some of these 
programs had unintended collateral effects on expatriates and immi-
grants and may have disproportionately punished less sophisticated tax-
payers.172 As various commentators have noted,173 the new reporting re-
gimes and enforcement initiatives cover not only classic offshore evaders 
(that is, wealthy Americans living in the United States but hiding signifi-
cant financial assets offshore to evade taxes), but also Americans actually 
living abroad and immigrants coming from abroad (who may hold off-
shore accounts in their countries of residence or home countries for less 
sinister reasons), as well as accidental Americans who may have never 
lived in the United States but who hold US citizenship. Although these 
latter types of taxpayers were not the animating target behind the re-
forms, they are required to comply with the new rules (a costly effort), 
and their failure to do so puts them at risk of paying high penalties. 
Moreover, heightened enforcement of existing rules in light of newly 
available cross-border data has impacted these taxpayers, for example, 
subjecting them to extremely high penalties that, while perhaps appro-
priate for egregious and willful tax evasion, may be disproportionate for 
less willful tax offences and errors. 
 Just as concerning, if not more so, is the fact that the OVDP “relief” 
programs actually favoured more sophisticated taxpayers and disadvan-
taged less savvy taxpayers, who are less likely to have engaged in egre-
gious conduct. A study by the National Taxpayer Advocate reported that 
the OVDP programs operating in 2009 and in 2011 generated regressive 
outcomes: taxpayers with fewer offshore assets and who lacked the advice 
of counsel ultimately paid disproportionately higher penalties than those 
taxpayers with more offshore assets or who enjoyed the advice of counsel 
in navigating the OVDP process.174 Thus, while there may have been 
 
171  See Oei, supra note 13 at 676–79. 
172  See e.g. Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 603–606. 
173  See e.g. Oei, supra note 13 at 694–96; Oei & Ring, supra note 2 at 604–606; 
Christians & Cockfield, supra note 24 at 36–37. 
174  See National Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 128 at 228–29. The report notes that 
for taxpayers in the 2009 OVDP, those with the smallest accounts paid offshore 
penalties nearly six times the median unpaid tax (eight times for unrepresented 
taxpayers), whereas those with the largest accounts paid only three times the un-
paid tax. 
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overall offshore enforcement gains, the distributive impacts associated 
with achieving those gains have been problematic. 
 These types of outcomes serve as a warning about how countries can 
get it both right and problematically wrong when obtaining more accurate 
information. Receipt of large quantities of data brings the opportunity to 
target abusive taxpayers and incentivize compliance through expansive 
audits and high penalties.175 Data thus brings more occasions for govern-
ments to “get it right.” But it also brings the risk of outsized burdens and 
penalties on taxpayers who may have committed less egregious offences 
or made unintentional mistakes. And to the extent enforcement leads to 
regressive outcomes or a focus on unfair or inefficient prioritization of en-
forcement targets, there is also a risk of getting it wrong. Governments 
should therefore think carefully about their enforcement approaches. 
More nuanced regimes, including those with low maximum penalties for 
low- income taxpayers and limited windows for audit or look-back for 
certain violations or high penalties, may be useful in carefully directing 
enforcement toward the right taxpayers.176 
B. A Framework for Considering Country-Level Differences 
 Thus far, Part III has argued that certain features of the global infor-
mation revolution suggest tensions and disagreements at the heart of the 
project. It has also argued that when data comes home, the ways in which 
it is used will be a function of technical/technological and political drivers, 
and that these may be intertwined.  
 We now take the analysis a step further by identifying eight particu-
lar political, institutional, and economic characteristics and factors that 
are likely to affect domestic outcomes and pathways when data comes 
home. Some of these characteristics are directly related to tax, while oth-
ers relate to broader background features and priorities that influence 
outcomes, such as attitudes toward data and information or the charac-
teristics of underlying legal institutions. Moreover, as we will return to 
later in this article, some of these factors are likely to work in tandem and 
cut in the same direction, while others may pull in opposite directions. 
Together, these factors make up the political, legal-institutional, and 
technological landscape that will shape outcomes when data comes home. 
Identification and analysis of these factors can help with predicting and 
evaluating the path ahead and for anticipating problems and concerns. 
 
175  See e.g. Nathan J Richman, “Tax Prosecutors Like Digging in Data Too” (2019) 
165:9 Tax Notes Federal 1504. 
176  See e.g. Tessa Davis, “The Tax-Immigration Nexus” (2017) 94:2 Denver L Rev 195 
at 244–46. 
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1. Level of Interest in Tax Revenues and Base Preservation 
 Different countries have different tax bases and levels of revenue ex-
traction, and different levels of interest in expanding such bases and ex-
traction. Some countries impose tax on a territorial basis, while others tax 
worldwide income of their domestic taxpayers. For example, in the years 
leading up to the US 2017 tax reform (which some view as shifting the US 
to a more territorial system for business taxation), it was common to ar-
gue that the United States was the remaining major economy pursuing 
worldwide taxation.177 Moreover, different countries impose different tax 
levels, irrespective of whether they exert worldwide or territorial taxa-
tion. A survey of top effective tax rates across forty-one OECD and EU 
member jurisdictions found that the rates ranged from 29–76 per cent.178 
A 2020 survey of individual statutory income tax rates across more than 
150 countries revealed rates that ranged from zero to 56.95 per cent, with a 
global average of 31.16 per cent and an OECD average of 41.22 per cent.179 
 These differences will impact countries’ degree of interest in and po-
tential use for data. As an obvious example, a country that only taxes the 
domestic-source interest income of its domestic taxpayers will probably 
not find exchanged information regarding that taxpayer’s foreign bank 
account interest to be very interesting, at least not for tax purposes. 
Likewise, a country that imposes low taxes on multinational enterprises 
(perhaps as an incentive to get those enterprises to do business in the 
country) may be less enthused about receiving CbC reports regarding 
business activities, at least from a tax perspective. As discussed below, 
this is not to say that such countries would not be interested in the infor-
mation for other purposes, such as for anti-corruption purposes, national 
security, or economic competition purposes. A tax-disinterested country 
may, in fact, be very interested in exchanged tax data for other reasons.  
 The key point is that the tax levels and tax base of a country are likely 
to affect the nature of its interest or lack thereof in exchanged tax infor-
mation and the utility of such information for tax enforcement purposes 
 
177  See Kimberly Clausing, “Beyond Territorial and Worldwide Systems of Taxation” 
(2015) 15:2 J Intl Finance & Economics 43 at 43–44. See also Rosanne Altshuler, Ste-
phen Shay & Eric Toder, “Lessons the United States Can Learn From Other Countries’ 
Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations” (21 January 
2015), online (pdf): Tax Policy Center <www.taxpolicycenter.org> [perma.cc/JFJ4-
ATXD]. 
178  See Jacob Lundberg & Gustav Fritzon, “Taxing High Incomes: A Comparison of 41 
Countries” (October 2019), online (pdf): Tax Foundation <taxfoundation.org> [perma. 
cc/D6Z4-BQDC]. 
179  See “Individual Income Tax Rates Table” (2020), online: KPMG <home.kpmg> [perma. 
cc/4VKC-3FSS]. 
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(which, after all, is the original intended use of such information).180 If a 
country is tax disinterested but interested in exchanged data and infor-
mation for non-tax purposes, this would perhaps warrant a conversation 
about whether such non-tax uses are justifiable given the original param-
eters and intent of the global tax information exchange project. 
2. Strength of Tax Administrative Capacity 
 It has been well recognized, including by the OECD and G20 coun-
tries, that the capacity to collect and administer taxes varies significantly 
among countries.181 Notably, the Platform for Collaboration on Tax, a 
joint project of the OECD, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the 
IMF, has focused attention on capacity building programs.182 Additionally, 
the African Tax Forum pursues an agenda of technical assistance aimed 
at “increas[ing] domestic resource mobilization,” developing African ex-
pertise, and establishing and meeting member country needs.183 Differen-
tial capacity, unsurprisingly, has implications for the pathway forward 
with respect to domestic uses of data as well. Countries with weaker in-
frastructure for the administration of taxes are likely to be less well 
equipped to store, process, utilize, and safeguard data. Thus, weak state 
capacity should be an indicator of heightened risks. 
 Of course, as with all of these factors, the degree of administrative ca-
pacity is not necessarily the only factor determining outcomes. For exam-
ple, even a state with relatively weak tax administrative capacity may be 
effective in safeguarding data if there are offsetting institutional and cul-
tural commitments to privacy and data protection. Even in the face of re-
 
180  Even countries that are interested in cross-border enforcement and revenue may have 
incentives to pursue some types of enforcement and not others. See e.g. Thomas R 
Tørsløv, Ludvig S Wier & Gabriel Zucman, “Externalities in International Tax En-
forcement: Theory and Evidence” (2020) National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper No 26899, online: <www.nber.org/papers/w26899> [perma.cc/SG7Y-KVAY] 
(noting incentives for high-tax countries to focus enforcement on profits booked to other 
high-tax countries, rather than on profit shifting to tax havens). 
181  There is a broader question of “state capacity” more generally, a concept that is alter-
nately defined as (1) capacity to extract revenue (i.e., tax rates and size of tax base); (2) 
administrative capacity to audit and enforce taxes; or (3) bureaucratic capacity more 
broadly. See Elissa Berwick & Fotini Christia, “State Capacity Redux: Integrating 
Classical and Experimental Contributions to an Enduring Debate” (2018) 21 Annual 
Rev Political Science 71; Dina Pomeranz & José Vila-Belda, “Taking State-Capacity 
Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities” (2019) 11 
Annual Rev Economics 755. 
182  See “What We Do” (last visited 4 August 2020), online: Platform for Tax Collaboration 
<www.tax-platform.org> [perma.cc/H8T6-HYF3]. 
183  “Technical Assistance” (last visited 19 June 2020), online: African Tax Administration 
Forum <ataftax.org> [perma.cc/B2FQ-SE9N]. 
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source scarcity, we might still see those scarce resources being directed 
toward data protection if that is deemed a national priority. It is also im-
portant to note that tax administrative capacity may be subjected to dif-
ferent measurement, and there may be disagreement regarding the ex-
tent of such capacity.184 
3. Extent of Commitment to Data-Based Regulation Methods 
 Moving away from tax, another hard-to-quantify metric is a country’s 
more general level of interest in using data to perform a regulatory func-
tion. It is increasingly recognized that some countries may be more likely 
than others to employ data-based methods of regulating national security, 
fighting crime, suppressing unrest, detecting money laundering, or en-
forcing taxes. In a 2019 study, the OECD looked at tax administrations 
across 58 countries, including a mix of advanced and emerging economies, 
and tracked their use of data. The OECD’s report noted that tax admin-
istrations are increasingly using “large and integrated data sets” and that 
“[m]ost tax administrations employ data scientists and many others are 
now pursuing recruitment strategies aimed at increasing the number of 
analysts and other specialists into tax administration.”185 Despite this 
trend, countries nonetheless vary in their extent and mix of data usage. 
For example, in assessing tax administrations’ reliance on particular 
types of third-party data, the study reported that of the 58 jurisdictions, 
the following numbers used each of these types of data sources: employer 
wage and salary information (53); financial institutions (50); other gov-
ernment agencies (56); international exchange (50); insurance companies 
(42); immovable property sales (47); online trading (16); asset leasing (21); 
prescribed contractors with reported payments to subcontractors (21); 
VAT invoices (39); and other (20).186 Differences may be a function of pop-
ulation size, geopolitical location, resources, existing bureaucratic capabil-
ities, and culture more generally.  
 By way of example, recent debates and discussions regarding tracing 
for COVID-19 reveal striking variations among countries’ comfort level in 
 
184  See generally Neil A Englehart, “State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights” 
(2009) 46:2 J Peace Research 163 (observing in the context of a study on state capacity 
and human rights that “[t]here is no generally accepted way of measuring state capaci-
ty. The concept itself is multidimensional, and no single summary measure is satisfac-
tory” at 167). 
185  OECD, Tax Administration 2019: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Ad-
vanced and Emerging Economies (Paris: OECD, 2019) at 23, online (pdf): <www.oecd-
ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/BKS7-YBFP]. 
186  See ibid at 47; “Figure 1.4 Use of Third Party Data, 2017” (last modified 2 August 
2019), online: OECD <read.oecd-ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/DMX9-M69B]. 
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using different types of data and tracking methods. Some jurisdictions 
have mandated use of tracker apps to grant users access to regions, cities, 
buildings, and transit systems, or to ensure compliance with quaran-
tines.187 Others rely on comprehensive access to cellphone data, credit 
card histories, and surveillance cameras as part of a system of compre-
hensive testing and tracing.188 In still other jurisdictions, privacy concerns 
have prompted resistance to extensive use of data collection in the effort 
to control the pandemic. As countries in Europe have begun introducing 
tracing apps upon opening up their borders, they have generally turned to 
voluntary participation in app tracing, with these decisions reflecting 
both legal constraints and public sentiment.189 
 More generally, countries that are more habituated in the use of data-
driven methods of law enforcement and regulation may be more likely to 
find tax and non-tax uses for data shared through the new modes of tax 
information exchange. Of course, this may shift over time as countries ac-
cumulate more data or build more institutional or bureaucratic systems 
that are able to easily make use of data. 
4. Level of Commitment to Privacy and Data Protection 
 Relatedly, the general level of a country’s commitment to privacy and 
data protection also matters and can shape outcomes when data comes 
home.190 Countries with high levels of commitment to data privacy may 
 
187  See e.g. Kari Soo Lindberg & Jinshan Hong, “People in China Need a Green Light 
From Alipay App to Move Around the Country”, Bloomberg (23 March 2020), online: 
<bloomberg.com> [perma.cc/2CZ8-AWDG] (reviewing requirement of app tracking 
for those seeking access and movement around the city and country); Heather Mur-
phy, “14 Days With a Quarantine Tracker Wristband: Does It Even Work?”, The New 
York Times (20 July 2020), online: <nytimes.com> [perma.cc/6R2B-KQCX] (Hong Kong 
required tracking bracelets for mandatory quarantine for everyone arriving from 
abroad, though their technical efficacy has been questioned). 
188  See e.g. Anthony Kuhn, “South Korea’s Tracking of COVID-19 Patients Raises Privacy 
Concerns”, National Public Radio (2 May 2020), online: <npr.org> [perma.cc/L5LS-
UB22]; Aylin Woodward, “South Korea Just Flexed Its Contact-Tracing Power: After 
Partiers With the Coronavirus Went to Nightclubs, It Found and Tested 46,000 Ex-
posed People”, Business Insider (22 May 2020), online: <businessinsider.com>  
[perma.cc/766M-BZTT]. 
189  For example, Italy’s minister for technology innovation, Paola Pisano, observed that 
countries are different and that, despite the technical ability for “military GPS [to] give 
me precision to three millimeters,” the government’s goal was to strike the right bal-
ance for Italy, which “is not South Korea.” See Jason Horowitz & Adam Satariano, 
“Europe Rolls Out Contact Tracing Apps, With Hope and Trepidation”, The New York 
Times (16 June 2020), online: <nytimes.com> [perma.cc/8W93-YGSC]. 
190  See e.g. Allison Christians, “Canada” in Eleonor Kristoffersson et al, eds, Tax Secrecy 
and Tax Transparency: The Relevance of Confidentiality in Tax Law (Frankfurt: Peter 
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prove more likely to be strongly committed to safeguarding data and us-
ing it in circumscribed ways—for example, by erecting firewalls between 
tax and non-tax uses. Of course, evaluating levels of commitment can be 
complicated. A country’s commitment to privacy may manifest differently 
with respect to tax and non-tax privacy. Moreover, some countries might 
be committed to privacy from government while others might view it ac-
ceptable for government to know information but demand privacy be-
tween taxpayers. Such background differences in countries’ conceptions of 
privacy and their views on government infuse policy conversations rang-
ing from taxation to national security to public health. 
 The level of a country’s commitment to privacy is likely to change over 
time. As with the other factors we have listed, it may also vary and exist 
in tension with other factors and commitments. For example, privacy 
commitments may conflict with an interest in raising revenue or safe-
guarding the tax base, leading to indeterminate outcomes.  
5. Availability of Existing Data Sources 
 Another potentially under-appreciated metric along which countries 
might be analyzed concerns access to existing data sources. If a country 
already has access to much of the data that is being newly exchanged, 
then the incremental new data might not have that much of an impact, or 
may simply confirm existing knowledge. Conversely, for other countries, 
new data troves may represent a significant increase in information. No-
tably, this factor matters both with respect to tax and non-tax enforce-
ment, though the mechanisms by which it comes into play may differ for 
each.  
 The availability of existing data sources may be related to the extent 
of a country’s commitment to using data-based regulation methods. Or, 
put differently, if a country is already used to using data to regulate be-
haviour, collect taxes, or fight crime as a cultural or institutional matter, 
this may mean that a lot of existing data has already been accumulated 
and that new data is not very interesting or useful. It is worth noting, 
however, that it is possible that a country has a lot of existing data about 
certain types of taxpayers (e.g., individuals) but not a lot of data about 
others (e.g., corporations). In such cases, the receipt of new data of a cer-
tain type may reshuffle costs and the feasibility of enforcement, and may 
thus reshape enforcement priorities.  
      
Lang, 2013) 209 at 209 (exploring the balance in Canada between tax privacy or confi-
dentiality and the availability of adequate information to enforce Canadian tax law and 
participate in information sharing).  
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6. Data Importers vs. Exporters 
 For a variety of reasons, countries differ in whether they are likely to 
be net “tax data importers” or net “tax data exporters.” Factors include 
the design of the country’s tax base, its current capacity to use data, the 
relevance of cross-border tax data in its tax system, the number of foreign 
bank customers in the country’s banks, the number of the country’s citi-
zens residing abroad, the number of multinational businesses that are tax 
residents of the country, and the number of corporate and other business 
entities “papered” or established in the country. Such differences, though 
not static, may shape countries’ formal and informal commitments to in-
formation exchange mechanisms.  
 Awareness of these differences and their potential effects predate the 
current wave of information exchange developments. For example, high-
lighting how differences in countries’ relative interest in tax information 
exchange affect outcomes, a 2010 critique of the limited number of tax in-
formation agreements signed with low-income countries (as distinct from 
tax havens) contended: “Industrialized countries [were] just not interest-
ed in concluding Tax Information Exchange Agreements with Low Income 
Countries because they don’t expect much profit from such agreements 
for themselves,”191 given their expectation that low-income countries pos-
sess little useful tax data on the industrialized countries’ taxpayers. A 
similar intuition lay behind a 2007 proposal by Professor Steven Dean to 
have “wealthy, information-dependent countries such as the United 
States ... [pay] other countries, specifically tax havens, for [access to tax 
information].”192  
 At their core, these types of observations and proposals serve as a re-
minder not only that the real-time value of tax data differs among coun-
tries, but that countries’ relative interest in data could impact their en-
thusiasm for embracing new global trends, their interest in fostering spe-
cific bilateral exchanges of tax data, and the degree to which cross-border 
tax data received will play a role in a country’s tax enforcement decisions.  
 
191  Misereor, “Double Tax Treaties and Tax Information Exchange Agreements: What Ad-
vantages for Developing Countries?” (26 January 2010), online (pdf): Tax Justice  
Network <taxjustice.net> [perma.cc/W89S-ERDW]. 
192  Steven A Dean, “The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information” (2008) 49:3 Bos-
ton College L Rev 605 at 610 (referencing his earlier proposal). See also Steven A Dean, 
“Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax 
Flight, and International Tax Cooperation” (2007) 58:5 Hastings L J 911 at 954–64 
(discussing his proposed payment or revenue sharing system for provision of tax infor-
mation by one country to another). 
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7. Strength of Rule of Law and Legal Institutions 
 Another metric that will likely affect the path going forward is the 
relative strength of rule of law and related institutions in a country. The 
intuition here is that the risk of politicized or otherwise inappropriate us-
es of data—such as to hunt political opponents, persecute unpopular mi-
norities, or protect family members—is likely to vary based on the nature 
of the country’s legal institutions.  
 The relationship between data use and the rule of law is certainly not 
absolute, however, and may be attenuated by other factors. For instance, 
critical legal studies perspectives, as well as the US examples noted 
above, suggest that disproportionate impacts (both intended and unin-
tended) on less powerful groups may occur in all countries, regardless of 
rule of law and strength of legal institutions. Moreover, strong rule of law 
countries with weaker substantive cultural or political commitments to 
data privacy and taxpayer rights may use data aggressively despite 
strong legal institutions. Finally, despite the existence of at least one 
widely known index,193 it is difficult to accurately and uncontroversially 
measure and compare the extent of rule of law and the strength of legal 
institutions.  
 In short, while informative, measures of rule of law and strength of 
legal institutions are only suggestive of a diminished likelihood of certain 
species of misuses (suggesting, for example, a lower likelihood of outright 
illegal uses). But without more information—such as information about 
the tax system and privacy culture—it does not tell us what the eventual 
outcome will be. 
8.  Two Wildcards  
 A final point is that no consideration of the immediate future of the 
international tax data revolution could be complete without explicit 
acknowledgement of two wildcards that have emerged on the scene in 
2020. The first, the OECD digital tax project,194 is less of a true surprise 
or newcomer. The BEPS project itself had already identified the challeng-
es to taxation from the rise of digitalization as a key priority for the 
 
193  See “WJP Rule of Law Index” (last visited 9 June 2020), online: World Justice Project 
<worldjusticeproject.org> [perma.cc/TW3X-MDHC]. 
194  See OECD, Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges 
Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS (Paris: OECD, May 2019), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/G2WX-
GUSH].  
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OECD in 2013195 and ultimately for the Inclusive Framework.196 Yet, the 
ways in which taxation and digitalization have come to dominate interna-
tional tax policy discussions in the past year are quite notable. Driving 
some of this attention was unilateral action on the part of a number of 
countries, which have introduced their own digital taxes to create lever-
age in negotiations with the United States and other jurisdictions.197 The 
OECD-led timetable for developing a global response to digitalization and 
taxation was delayed in part by the second wildcard (the COVID-19 pan-
demic) but continues to move along with end-of-year targets for initial 
agreement among countries.198  
 The second wildcard, the COVID-19 pandemic, has been much more of 
a genuine shock to global health, economic, and political systems. Alt-
hough in theory the prospect of such a pandemic was well known, the tim-
ing and magnitude of the global emergence of this virus has now raised 
unanticipated challenges.199 Now that a pandemic is upon us, countries 
across the globe have implemented significant spending programs to ex-
tend financial support to both individuals and businesses.200 Though these 
 
195  See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD, 2013), 
online (pdf): <www.oecd-ilibrary.org> [perma.cc/7APB-QYXH] (Action Item 1 looks to 
“[a]ddress the tax challenges of the digital economy” at 14–15). 
196  See “Action 1: Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation” (last visited 22 June 2020), 
online: OECD <oecd.org> [perma.cc/A5XF-UA86]. 
197  See e.g. Keith Bradsher, “France Says U.S. Talks Could Produce Agreement on Digital 
Taxes”, The New York Times (22 January 2020), online: <nytimes.com> [perma.cc/ 
4D2R-MD69] (reviewing France’s introduction of a digital sales tax and the resulting 
efforts at negotiation between the United States and France). 
198  See e.g. Hamza Ali & Isabel Gottlieb, “Pandemic Delays Global Agreement on Digital 
Tax to Fall (2)”, Bloomberg Tax (4 May 2020), online: <news.bloombergtax.com> [per-
ma.cc/47HP-EAJL] (noting that the OECD decided to push some of its deadlines on se-
curing international agreement on a digital tax plan and to incorporate virtual meet-
ings in the process: “The reasonable expectation here is that we may have a staged pro-
cess on at least some of the aspects,” explained Pascal Saint-Amans, director of the 
OECD’s Center for Tax Policy and Administration). 
199  See generally Hannah Allam, “Years Before Pandemic, War Games Predicted A ‘Global 
Tempest’”, National Public Radio (19 May 2020), online: <www.npr.org> [per-
ma.cc/X4UW-GYJ2]; Jeffrey K Taubenberger, David M Morens & Anthony S Fauci, 
“The Next Influenza Pandemic: Can It Be Predicted?” (2007) 297:18 J American Medi-
cal Assoc 2025. 
200  See e.g. Hiba Hafiz et al, “Regulating in Pandemic: Evaluating Economic and Financial 
Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Crisis” (2020) Boston College Legal Studies Work-
ing Paper No 527, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3555980>  (reviewing the US response 
to the initial months of the pandemic); “Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Canada’s 
Response” (last visited 22 June 2020), online: Government of Canada <canada.ca> 
[perma.cc/DF8V-84Q7] (mapping out Canada’s legislative and other responses to the 
pandemic); “Japan’s Emergency Stimulus Reaches ¥117 Trillion as Virus Crisis Deep-
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financial outlays are viewed by many as essential to averting more seri-
ous social, health, and economic crises, the price tag is not cheap. Many 
jurisdictions are already thinking about how to pay for the pandemic.201 
 How might these two forces impact countries’ responses to the inter-
national tax information revolution? The first, digital taxation, provides a 
new path for raising tax revenues. The second provides a powerful reason 
why countries across the globe may seek to increase effective enforcement 
of current tax rules (thereby increasing tax collections) and to adopt new 
tax bases. Access to additional and new data increases a country’s ability 
to do both. To the extent new data flows enable countries to identify tax-
payers who have not been reporting and paying taxes consistently with 
existing rules, and to the extent data flows increase the feasibility of im-
plementing new tax bases, the investment in the new data revolution 
may yield new payoffs, and may attract even greater interest and com-
mitment of resources. 
 Our delineation of these factors does not aim to solve the problems as-
sociated with uses of tax data at the nation-state level. Our goal instead is 
to identify the main factors that are likely to influence how data is used 
and what risks and outcomes may arise. Awareness of differing national 
landscapes going forward will enable domestic and international organi-
zations and policymakers to formulate effective revenue policy, anticipate 
problems in advance, and protect the interests of citizens and taxpayers. 
C. The Path Forward  
 What can and should the response of the global community be when a 
country’s own distinctive mix of domestic politics, legal institutions, and 
technology drives that country’s use of international tax data? We briefly 
map out some of the major options.  
      
ens”, The Japan Times (20 April 2020), online: <japantimes.co.jp> [perma.cc/SF7K-
9D6T] (outlining Japan’s emergency financial package in response to COVID-19). 
201  See e.g. Frans Vanistendael, “Will the Coronavirus Pandemic Cure the EU Budget?” 
(2020) 98:12 Tax Notes Intl 1417; Sam Edwards, “Wealthy, Big Tech Targets in Spain’s 
Post-Virus Tax Overhaul”, Bloomberg Tax (15 June 2020), online: <news.bloombergtax. 
com> [perma.cc/683S-BQFY] (reviewing an array of options in Spain for expanding tax 
revenues post-coronavirus); Alex M Parker, “COVID-19 May Usher In Digital Taxes 
Despite US Tariff Threat” (3 June 2020), online: Law 360 <law360.com> [per-
ma.cc/5M5N-P4YF] (exploring the prospect of countries’ turning to digital taxes in re-
sponse to the COVID-19 fiscal crisis); Tarcísio Diniz Magalhães & Allison Christians, 
“Rethinking Tax for the Digital Economy After COVID-19” (30 June 2020) [un-
published, archived at SSRN], online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3635907> (examining the 
prospect of a global excess profits tax in a digital world post-COVID); Mindy Herzfeld, 
“Tax Optimism for a Post-Pandemic World” (2020) 98:4 Tax Notes Intl 399 (considering 
ways in which the pandemic could help reshape taxation). 
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 First, although the increased availability of international tax data is 
substantially a function of multilateral agreement, whether with respect 
to BEPS or to the exchange of tax rulings, there is, as noted, no obligation 
on countries to use the information received. Thus, if jurisdictions fail to 
act on newly acquired tax data, whether due to inadequate resources or 
alternative preferences or enforcement priorities, other countries have 
limited grounds to object.  
 To the extent the jurisdiction seeks assistance in capacity building, 
other nation-states or international bodies eager to see countries enforce 
their tax rules may offer to provide such assistance, but this type of en-
gagement would be voluntary on both sides. Notably, national decisions 
regarding levels of funding for tax enforcement have historically been 
within the purview of domestic politics and not subject to direct outside 
control.  
 If a jurisdiction fails to act on information for political reasons (for ex-
ample, because the taxpayer is a politically powerful individual or multi-
national corporation), other countries may have limited grounds for direct 
action. However, if a country’s tax non-enforcement decisions confer a fi-
nancial advantage on a domestic taxpayer that is in direct competition 
with foreign businesses, there may be both an incentive and, in some cas-
es, a legal basis for other countries to react. For example, the EU’s state 
aid investigations in recent years202 suggest a path by which such objec-
tions could manifest. But such options are nonetheless limited. In particu-
lar, where non-enforcement occurs only through inaction rather than 
through advance taxpayer-favourable rulings, it may be harder for coun-
tries to find legal grounds on which to object. 
 If a jurisdiction uses international tax data for politically driven en-
forcement, the potential for objections by other countries or international 
organization seems stronger, but is still by no means appropriate or inevi-
table. As discussed above,203 it is not altogether clear what constitutes “po-
litically driven” use of tax data and when such use becomes inappropri-
ate. Government efforts to convict taxpayers on tax crimes when convic-
tions on more serious crimes have eluded enforcers are the subject of de-
bate, but they are not viewed as universally inappropriate or abusive. 
Moreover, even if tax enforcement efforts cross some broadly acknowl-
edged line into inappropriate political use, other jurisdictions may not ob-
ject. This may be the outcome, for example, if the acting country is one 
 
202  See e.g. General Court of the European Union, Press Release, 90/20, “The General 
Court of the European Union Annuls the Decision Taken by the Commission Regard-
ing the Irish Tax Rulings in Favour of Apple” (15 July 2020), online (pdf): CURIA  
<curia.europa.eu> [perma.cc/B8GL-JNA3]. 
203  See Part III.A.2.b., above. 
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that attracts relatively little attention, if the taxpayer in question is not 
particularly sympathetic, or if other jurisdictions are hesitant to use their 
political capital on this matter. In contrast, a more sympathetic taxpayer 
subject to more obvious political targeting could draw the attention of 
other countries or even international organizations.  
 If the taxpayer being targeted by a country is a citizen of or MNE 
headquartered in another country, their home jurisdiction may step in 
formally or informally to challenge the country in question’s tax enforce-
ment process. Informally, objections can be voiced bilaterally or in multi-
lateral discussions, and such objections may focus on the specific mecha-
nism by which the tax information was delivered, may centre on the spe-
cific manner or instance of targeting, or may pertain to information shar-
ing more generally. Formally, objections may be raised through infor-
mation exchange mechanisms (such as the Multilateral Competent Au-
thority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports)204 or 
through collateral means (such as state aid investigations mentioned 
above).  
 Finally, a country’s failure to adequately protect taxpayer data may be 
most likely to draw an immediate response from other jurisdictions, par-
ticularly if such failure results in a high-profile leak or other unauthor-
ized transmission of taxpayer data affecting the other jurisdiction. Such 
failure could be the result of inadequate resources and data privacy poli-
cies, but it could also be the result of intentional sharing of foreign tax-
payer data with domestic competitors. Although the causes and remedies 
would be different in these cases, the foreign taxpayers’ protestations and 
their efforts to secure the assistance of their home jurisdiction would like-
ly be strong. 
 The bottom line is that many decisions about the use of international 
tax data remain at the discretion of each jurisdiction. While we can flag 
the most likely pathways and possibilities, eventual outcomes will depend 
on the type of use or non-use and the specific countries in question. At the 
end of the day, countries are most likely to intervene where their own 
taxpayers are harmed or burdened—whether through inappropriate en-
forcement or inadequate protection of data—or where a spoken or unspo-
ken norm has been violated in a high-profile instance. Stepping back, this 
domestic landscape of inchoate possibilities, risks, and potential reactions 
is the entirely predictable next step of the global tax information revolu-
tion, and one that nation-states should not neglect. 
 
204 CbC MCAA, supra note 133. 




 International tax problems are not susceptible to final resolution at 
the global level. At its core, taxation remains a national endeavour. Thus, 
international tax agreements only truly take shape through their incorpo-
ration into the domestic tax process. In this article, we have discussed 
how—notwithstanding the global tax information revolution of the last 
decade—technological and political forces at the nation-state level may 
lead to unanticipated or undesirable outcomes when data comes home or 
may derail the revolution altogether. We have flagged particularly worri-
some potential outcomes, outlined eight specific country-level characteris-
tics that may trigger these outcomes as data comes home, and mapped 
the potential reactions and responses. Awareness of the possible pitfalls 
and their determinants can help policymakers identify problem areas, 
protect taxpayers, and improve outcomes. Importantly, a nation’s profile 
in terms of its country-level characteristics and the relative weight of 
these characteristics over time may shift quickly if the country experienc-
es notable political, economic, or other shocks, or gradually, if these fea-
tures morph through slower-moving trends.  
 The global shock of the COVID-19 pandemic will inevitably generate 
new pressures on countries. Whether these pressures create significant 
shifts in countries’ ability to invest in tax infrastructure, their desire to 
dramatically increase tax revenues (including through digital taxation), 
their political commitment to privacy and data protection, and their polit-
ical stability remain to be seen. At a minimum, the introduction of this 
wildcard factor underscores the significance of carefully mapping the 
risks and determinants of major policy shifts such as the global tax in-
formation revolution. With such a frame, we can better track critical haz-
ards and deliver policy responses in real time. 
     
 
